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ABSTRACT 
Healthy social interactions are critical for children’s development and 
academic and life success. Relevant research is found in two key disciplines with 
different emphases: Developmental psychology focuses on individual thoughts, 
motivations and traits; and behavioral economics and game theory focuses on 
behavioral tasks. This project integrated these approaches by validating a game-
theoretic task for children, the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD), and 
demonstrated how it can be used to elucidate the mechanisms underlying children’s 
social interactions. 
I developed a novel RPD with fixed-strategy partners in order to test specific 
hypotheses based on developmental theories of social interaction. Children between 9 
and 11 years of age (N = 167) were tested on the RPD followed by questions about 
how they played and interpreted the task. Parents completed a questionnaire assessing 
		 vii	
their child’s reactive and proactive aggressive traits, a basis for predicting decisions 
in the RPD. Children also completed a Social Information Processing (SIP) task with 
novel positive scenarios in addition to standard negative ones. 
I hypothesized that: 1) children would interpret the RPD as a real social 
interaction and engage in strategic forms of play according to game theory; 2) 
children with different levels of reactive and proactive aggression would show 
different patterns of RPD play based on theories of aggression; 3) the SIP responses 
would predict different levels of cooperation in the RPD, and the positive scenarios 
would generate responses consistent with the general SIP theory. 
Results showed support for the first hypothesis with classes of motivations 
(interpersonal and strategic self-interest) predicting RPD behavior. The second 
hypothesis was partially confirmed: Children rated high on reactive aggression 
showed reactive responses in the RPD. This analysis also revealed an important novel 
finding that high-reactive children followed a game-theoretic strategy known as 
“Grim” – they did not return to cooperation after partner defection. The third 
hypothesis was partially confirmed: Responses for the positive scenarios were 
consistent with the SIP model but did not predict RPD play. 
These findings demonstrate the value of integrating theoretical and 
methodological approaches from developmental psychology and game theory in order 
to study the mechanisms of social interaction. 	
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: INTEGRATING APPROACHES 
FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND GAME THEORY TO STUDY 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
Healthy social interactions are critical for individual wellbeing, as well as 
academic and life success (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2000; 
Catalano, Berglund, Ryan, Lonczak, & Hawkins, 2004; Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, 
Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011). As such, the study of both positive and negative social 
interactions has been central to understanding children’s development and improving 
their life outcomes. However, within developmental psychology, the study of positive 
and negative social behaviors has evolved separately to a large extent. For example, well-
developed theories and taxonomies of aggressive behavior have remained detached from 
developmental theories of prosocial behavior. The most well-established model for 
understanding the psychology of social interactions, the Social Information Processing 
(SIP) model, has focused primarily on negative interactions despite being conceived as a 
general theory of both positive and negative interactions. Methodological approaches are 
also very different with negative behaviors mostly studied using hypothetical vignettes 
and questionnaires and positive behaviors studied with a combination of questionnaires 
and behavioral tasks.  
In contrast to this divide within developmental psychology, positive and negative 
social interactions have been studied together by researchers utilizing the tools of 
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behavioral economics and game theory. Behavioral economists, evolutionary theorists 
and psychologists have long used interactive tasks with real rewards to understand human 
decisions. These so-called “games” have revealed much about how cooperation emerges 
and stabilizes in societies given the tension between positive motivations (altruism, trust) 
and negative or strategic motivations (punishment, self-interest). Despite these advances, 
much less is known about the psychological mechanisms that underlie social interactions 
within the context of games and how these decisions align with psychological traits and 
models of social cognition. Moreover, developmental psychologists have only begun to 
adopt these tools in recent years and the links between children’s decisions in games and 
developmental theories remain unclear. 
This dissertation represents an attempt to bridge this theoretical and 
methodological divide by combining a behavioral measure from game theory, the 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD), with more traditional questionnaires and vignettes 
from developmental psychology. In what follows, we review theory and evidence for two 
forms of aggression – reactive and proactive – and highlight the need for new behavioral 
tasks. We then review the SIP model and point out that even though it has been 
extensively tested for negative interactions, it is unclear whether the same mechanisms 
apply universally, also for positive social interactions. Finally, we review the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) game and its use with children, arguing that it can serve as a safe, 
quantitatively rigorous task for measuring behavioral phenotypes in both negative and 
positive social interactions. 
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Reactive and proactive aggression 
One of the more well-developed lines of research on social interactions in 
children has focused on aggressive behaviors, or when and how social interactions result 
in hurt, harm or injury. Aggressive actions can be either physical (i.e.,, hitting) or 
relational (i.e.,, gossip and social exclusion). Aggression is one of the most common 
behaviors in negative interactions among children. Within the US, bullying (physical or 
relational) constitutes a major problem in schools. According to a 2009 survey of 6500 
children from 6-12 grade, 39.4% experienced bullying in 6th grade, a percentage which 
decreased to 20.4% by 12 grade (National Center for Education Statistics). Aggression 
has negative consequences for both aggressors and victims. For aggressors, it can indicate 
the presence of clinical disorders such as Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), Conduct 
Disorder (CD) or Conduct Problems (CP), with outcomes sometimes including juvenile 
delinquency and crime. For both aggressors and victims, negative interactions involving 
aggressive behavior can lead to internalizing disorders at later times. 
Work in developmental psychology has identified two different forms of 
aggression, reactive and proactive, which differ in the kinds of social interactions that 
prompt and sustain them (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Baker, 2006). Reactive aggression is 
characterized by an impulsive defensive response to perceived hostility (Fontaine & 
Dodge, 2006), while proactive aggression is characterized by controlled aggressive 
behavior that anticipates a reward (Matthys & Lochman, 2011).  
Reactive and proactive aggression are different in several aspects including the 
trigger of the response, the goal, the time-scale of the response, and physiological 
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reactions (Kempes, Matthys, de Vries, & van Engeland, 2005). Reactive aggression is 
triggered by a threat or provocation, which may be either real or perceived. Indeed, one 
key feature of people with reactive traits is a tendency to perceive ambiguous interactions 
as intentional and hostile  – the so-called hostile attribution bias (Dodge & Coie, 1987). 
This trigger gives rise to anger and the response is often intended to harm the perceived 
provocateur, although this may actually be a self-protective or defensive move intended 
to prevent further provocation.  Reactive aggression is enacted on a short time scale and 
is accompanied by high levels of physiological arousal (Kempes et al., 2005).  
 Proactive aggression, in contrast, is triggered by the opportunity to obtain a 
desired material gain. It is characterized by instrumental goals: gaining a benefit from the 
interaction, for example, by using blackmail or intimidation through physical aggression 
to obtain desired goods. Proactive aggression is characterized by long-term, calculated 
behaviors and is associated with low physiological arousal. 
The two types of aggression are also distinguished based on differences in 
developmental origins, trajectory and outcomes: reactive aggression is associated with 
histories of physical abuse, and is thought to emerge as a reaction to a hostile 
environment; proactive aggression is not linked to abuse and is believed to emerge in 
environments that support the use of aggression as a means of achieving one’s goals 
(Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997). In a review of the literature on 
developmental trajectories of aggressive behavior Vitaro et al. (2006) note a reported 
decline in physical aggression between the ages of 4-11, but an increase in social 
aggression, a more indirect, covert and “circuitous” type of aggression. The authors also 
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suggest that the increase in self-regulatory capabilities may foster a decline in reactive 
aggression, while proactive aggression could remain stable or increase during 
adolescence in environments supportive of aggressive solutions to problem solving and 
access to resources. Kempes et al. (2005) also point out the physical and impulsive nature 
of the aggressive behavior in young children compared to the more planned and 
calculated aggression that appears with age and with improvements in cognitive abilities 
such as planning. They note that this distinction is partly supported by the finding of 
Connor, Steingard, Cunningham, Anderson and Melloni (2004) that reactive aggression 
is negatively related to age but proactive aggression is not and appears to remain stable 
with age at least for some individuals. This lack of a decline with age may help to explain 
why proactive aggression, but not reactive aggression, is associated with juvenile 
delinquency, criminal behavior and ODD and CD diagnoses in mid-adolescence. 
Lastly, separate temperamental and possibly genetic factors have been linked to 
the emergence of the two different types of aggressive behavior. For example, reactive, 
but not proactive aggression has been linked to anxiety, angry reactivity, emotional 
dysregulation and inattention (Dodge & Coie, 1987; Dodge et al., 1997; Vitaro et al., 
2006). In contrast, proactive, but not reactive, aggression has been linked to callous 
unemotional traits (Helseth, Waschbusch, King & Willoughby, 2015). 
 
The Social Information Processing model 
The SIP model has been proposed as a series of cognitive steps for appraising 
social interactions, which explain how and why aggressive behaviors are formulated, as 
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opposed to viewing aggressiveness as simply a trait. The SIP model posits that behaviors 
are generated through five information processing steps (that can occur in parallel): 1) 
encoding situational cues, 2) attributing intent, 3) selecting goals, 4) generating possible 
behavioral responses, and 5) evaluating these responses and selecting one to be enacted 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994).  
Encoding situational cues refers to the number and type of details that are 
encoded about the situation (Dodge & Newman, 1981), followed by attributions of other 
people’s intentions when they have caused a particular outcome. Thus, if someone bumps 
into you while walking, one will assess whether this was done on purpose or by accident 
(Dodge, 2008). Goal selection follows and falls into two general categories: relational 
goals, which are concerned with enhancing or preserving the relationship (e.g.,, avoiding 
unnecessary conflict), or instrumental goals, which seek to profit from the interaction 
(e.g.,, obtaining material gain or asserting dominance; Camodeca & Goossens, 2005; van 
Rest et al., 2014). In line with the goals adopted, a number of possible responses are 
formulated that can be either aggressive or socially competent (Dodge & Godwin, 2013). 
Those responses are then evaluated based on several criteria including how well they 
would achieve the goal, how competent one is at enacting the response (e.g.,, how 
physically or emotionally capable one is to respond aggressively) and how socially and 
morally acceptable the response is (Kupersmidt, Stelter, & Dodge, 2011). Based on the 
evaluation step a response is selected and enacted. 
The SIP model has been successfully tested with regards to the formulation of 
aggressive behaviors by drawing connections between the steps and the presence and 
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frequency of aggressive behaviors in daily life, effects that have been found consistent 
across different ages and cultures (e.g., Dodge et al., 2015). Some studies have also found 
that reactive and proactive aggression are differentially linked to the SIP model. The 
propensity to attribute hostile (as opposed to benign) intent to others in ambiguous 
situations has been linked to the emergence of reactive aggressive behaviors (Crick & 
Dodge, 1996; de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). On the other 
hand, adopting primarily instrumental goals rather than relational ones and evaluating 
aggression more positively have been linked to proactive aggression (Crick & Dodge, 
1996). 
Although the SIP has been conceived as a general model of social interactions, 
much less attention has been given to positive social behaviors. Only a few studies 
suggest that links can be drawn between the SIP model and prosocial behavior (Andrade 
et al., 2012; Laible, McGinley, Carlo, Augustine, & Murphy, 2014; Laible, Murphy, & 
Augustine, 2014; Nelson & Crick, 1999;). Some studies have linked socially competent 
SIP in hypothetical negative scenarios with prosocial behaviors in real life. For example, 
Nelson and Crick (1999) found that in negative interactions including provocation, 
prosocial young adolescents were less likely to attribute hostile intent, evaluated 
aggression more negatively and were more likely to adopt relational rather than 
instrumental goals. Other studies have also found longitudinal relations between SIP in 
hypothetical negative interactions and both aggressive and prosocial real-life behaviors 
(Laible, Murphy, & Augustine, 2014; Laible, McGinley, Carlo, Augustine, & Murphy 
2014). 
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None of these studies however have assessed the SIP model in positive 
interactions. It is thus unclear if the same steps in the thought process apply when 
positive behaviors, such as positive reciprocity, are generated in positive interactions. 
Andrade et al. (2012) varied the outcome and the intent of the interaction partner in the 
vignette to include both positive outcomes and ambiguous, positive or negative 
intentions. The study found differences in SIP between children with ADHD and controls 
in the types of intent they attributed and the behavioral responses they formulated, but the 
study did not investigate whether the same links between the SIP steps (intent attribution, 
goal selection on response evaluation on one hand and response generation on the other) 
apply in the case of positive outcome interactions. For example, does attributing positive 
intent predict positive reciprocity? 
To have a unified framework for how both negative and positive behaviors occur, 
mechanisms proposed by the SIP model still need to be tested for positive interactions 
using positive-outcome vignettes. In addition, the SIP model should be tested along with 
tasks measuring children’s actual positive and negative behavior in order to determine 
whether the steps of thinking for vignettes predicts decisions in real social interactions. 
 
Questionnaire and vignette-based measures of aggression 
Reactive and proactive aggression have been primarily measured though self, 
parent or teacher report, and the SIP steps associated with aggressive behaviors have 
primarily been assessed using hypothetical vignettes. Report measures consist of 
questionnaires listing behaviors that are characteristic of each of the aggression types, 
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such as “this child strikes back when teased” for reactive aggression or “this child uses 
force to dominate peers” for proactive aggression (Kempes et al., 2005). The first such 
questionnaire was developed by Dodge and Coie (1987) as a teacher-report questionnaire. 
Parent-report and self-report questionnaires have since been developed (Kempes, 
Matthys, Maassen, Goozen, & van Engeland, 2006; Raine et al., 2006). These measures 
focus on identifying the occurrence of the behaviors within the past week or month, but 
offer little information about the psychological mechanisms involved.  
Although reactive and proactive aggression predict different outcomes when 
measured with standard questionnaires, the two forms of aggression are highly correlated 
(see meta-analysis by Polman, de Castro, Koops, van Boxtel, & Merk, 2007, and other 
studies: Bailey, & Ostrov, 2008; Dodge et al., 1997; Hubbard, Parker, Ramsden & 
Smithmyer, 1998; Kempes et al., 2005). That is, individual children are more likely to 
have high levels of both reactive and proactive aggression than be high on one and low 
on the other. In fact, across studies, proactive aggression is rarely found alone, even in 
clinical groups, while reactive only or reactive plus proactive groups appear more 
consistently. Assessments that better distinguish between reactive and proactive 
aggression are needed in order to understand how each form of aggression leads to 
different psychosocial outcomes (Card & Little, 2006). 
The SIP model has been used as way to better differentiate between the two types 
of aggression by distinguishing between the cognitive processes involved in the 
formulation of the aggressive behavior. The model has traditionally been measured 
through hypothetical vignettes. In a typical measure of the SIP model, children are asked 
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to imagine themselves in a hypothetical scenario in which the ambiguous actions of 
another child lead to a negative outcome (e.g.,, being pushed from behind which causes 
something cherished to be dropped and broken). Then children are asked a series of 
questions to determine their intent attribution (if the action was purposeful or accidental), 
their goals for the interaction (retaliation or preserving the relationship), their behavioral 
response (aggression or a socially competent response) and finally their evaluation of this 
responses (is aggression evaluated positively or negatively?). SIP vignettes have 
successfully been able to distinguish between reactive and proactive forms of aggression, 
allowing a lower level of analysis than questionnaires alone. 
Both report questionnaires and hypothetical vignette measures of reactive and 
proactive aggression have been useful in characterizing these behaviors, but both 
measures have limitations. Retrospective report measures mainly focus on determining 
the past occurrences of aggression, with little focus on how these behaviors are generated 
in social interactions. Vignettes are a useful proxy for social interactions, but they do not 
capture actual behavior as it unfolds in real time and thus might not elicit the same kind 
of emotional and behavioral engagement as real situations do (Sharp, Ha, & Fonagy, 
2011). How well a hypothetical scenario is able to bring online the cognitive mechanisms 
of the SIP model might also vary depending on how vivid one’s imagination is and how 
much children would be able to “transpose” themselves into the situation described. In 
addition, vignette measures give the responder a prolonged time for considering their 
options, which would not be the case for most fast-paced real-world interactions (Yaros, 
Lochman, Rosenbaum, & Jimenez-Camargo, 2014). 
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Another limitation of these measures is that they fail to capture how aggressive 
behavior evolves over the course of an interaction, and how this evolution might be 
contingent on the responses of the interaction partner. Report measures are too broad to 
capture the fine details of how aggression waxes and wanes in an interaction. Even the 
steps described in the SIP model are only tested with regards to internal representations 
of the initial social stimulus (described in the vignette) that leads to the first behavioral 
reaction, but in real life, an interaction is unlikely to stop there. The vignette measures do 
not tell us what happens after the first aggressive response: what if it turns out the other 
child did not do it on purpose, or what if the other child reconsiders their actions and is 
trying to restore good relations – will the aggressor be appeased and return to formulating 
positive or socially competent behaviors? These kinds of dynamic responses are likely to 
vary for reactive and proactive aggression but few attempts have been made to elicit these 
responses in children. 
 
Behavioral measures of aggression 
In order to address these limitations, a few studies have used “real-time” tasks in 
which the play partner acts in ways meant to elicit frustration (e.g., Atkins, Osborne, 
Bennett, Hess, & Halperin, 2001; Atkins, Osborne, & Brown, 1993; Hubbard et al., 2002; 
Muñoz, Frick, Kimonis, & Aucoin, 2008; Phillips & Lochman, 2003; Waschbusch, 
Pelham, Jennings, Greiner, Tarter, & Moss, 2002). Four general experimental paradigms 
have been developed for aggression research. First, Hubbard et al. (2002) used a game in 
which a real play partner, a confederate child, cheats. They found that children high in 
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reactive aggression showed more angry non-verbal behaviors and higher skin 
conductance reactivity, with both increasing over the course of the game.  
Second, a computerized pinball game with pre-programmed, anonymous partners 
has been used to distinguish between hostile and instrumental aggression. Players could 
frustrate the partner through either a hostile but non-instrumental action, playing an 
aversive noise in the partner’s headphones, or an instrumental action that would block the 
opponent’s game by “tilting” the partner’s screen (Atkins et al., 1993; Atkins et al., 2001; 
Phillips, & Lochman, 2003). The measure was validated showing that the noise was 
perceived as hostile and the tilt move as both hostile and instrumental (Atkins et al., 
1993). Atkins et al. (2001) showed that instrumental aggression in the game was 
correlated with teacher ratings of proactive aggression. Further, when the partner could 
punish aggressive behavior, continued aggressive responses were correlated with 
inattention and impulsivity. Phillips and Lochman (2003) used the same game in 
conjunction with an intervention designed to reduce aggression. Instrumental training (in 
which the child is rewarded for not being aggressive) reduced aggressive responses 
regardless of the children’s reactive or proactive aggressive profile. 
Third, a computerized competitive reaction time task has been used in several 
studies (Helseth et al., 2015; Muñoz et al., 2008; Waschbusch et al., 2002). Children 
competed with the partner to respond quickly to a cue on screen; the winner could take 
away points from the loser of each round and accompany it by a verbal message. 
Unknown to the child, the game was rigged and the opponent was automated: their 
decisions to take away points were predetermined and the messages prerecorded. 
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Children were thus exposed to several high provocation trials, in which the opponent took 
away lots of points and accompanied them with highly aversive messages, and some low 
provocation trials in which the opponent was more conciliatory. Waschbusch et al. (2002) 
found that children with a co-morbid diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) and ODD/CD reacted more to low provocation than the other groups 
(typically developing controls, ADHD-only and ODD/CD-only), while all groups reacted 
almost at ceiling to high provocation. The co-morbid diagnosis group showed a slower 
dissipation of anger and a propensity to hold a “grudge”. In other words, they continued 
to punish the partner by taking points over multiple trials following high provocation. 
Muñoz et al. (2008) used the game with adolescents in a juvenile detention facility. They 
found that adolescents high in both reactive and proactive aggression were more likely to 
initiate provocation, whereas reactive-only adolescents did not. All adolescents 
responded to high provocation but the reactive-only group was highly responsive to low 
provocation as well.  
Helseth et al. (2015) used the reaction time task with children with Conduct 
Problems (CP) and Callous-Unemotional traits (CU) adding another response option to 
the game inspired by Atkins et al. (2013), namely playing the aversive noise for the 
partner. They found that children with CPCU combined exhibited both proactive and 
reactive aggression to low provocation, while all children exhibited reactive aggression in 
response to high provocation. Also children with CPCU did not show the pattern of play 
indicative of holding a grudge found by Waschbusch et al. (2002) in children with co-
morbid ADHD and CD/ODD diagnosis. 
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Finally, Yaros et al. (2014) developed a computer car race game for testing the 
SIP steps involved in evaluating potentially aggressive social interactions. The game 
included ambiguous provocations in the form of crashes from the opposing car. Children 
were asked to attribute positive (trying to be helpful) or negative (being hostile) intent to 
the opponent. They found that reactive aggression was positively related to hostile intent 
attributions when controlling for proactive aggression and proactive aggression was 
negatively related to hostile attribution when controlling for reactive aggression. 
In summary, all of these tasks safely measure aggressive behaviors in an 
interactive context. However, the interaction contexts were purely competitive with no 
other incentives beyond winning the game. In these tasks the play partner always had the 
role of an opponent, and the games presented no opportunities to work with the partner. 
Also, beyond risking retaliation, acting aggressively in the game was not directly costly 
to the participants and there were no incentives to restore good relations with the partner. 
In real-life interactions, however, aggression can occur in non-competitive situations as 
well. Aggressors and victims often have more complex roles than being each other’s 
adversaries. Further, in interactions beyond the game context, there are often costs to 
engaging in aggressive behavior: loss of resources, damaged relationships and missed 
opportunities for cooperating with others and pursuing mutual goals. Many of these 
limitations can be addressed by using “cooperative dilemmas” or games from behavioral 
economics and game theory. We next provide an overview of one such game, the 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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Background for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Cooperative dilemmas in the form of strategic games have been used to study live 
interactions for several decades in the fields of economics and game theory. These games 
provide an opportunity for studying both positive and negative interactions in real time 
and in a safe way. Games are typically played online, anonymity between players is 
maintained and real rewards can be gained or lost so that player decisions are 
consequential.  
One key tool from game theory that has been used for measuring both positive 
and negative behavior is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Rand & Nowak, 2013). As 
a task, the PD formulates a situation in which two people decide either to cooperate (C) 
or to defect (D), and the outcome (the payoff) is a result of their combined decisions (see 
Figure 1). The payoffs to the players are structured such that the combined payoff is 
maximized if both players cooperate (CC), but each player can potentially maximize their 
own individual payoff by defecting when the partner cooperates (DC). Defection can also 
protect one from receiving the lowest payoff: if one cooperates when the partner defects 
(CD) they get the lowest amount possible, often zero.  Thus, both players have an 
incentive to defect (DD), but if this occurs they each get the same small amount.  
The payoff amounts for the four possible outcomes typically falls in a rank order. 
For Player A (the first letter in the combination), the highest payout occurs when Player 
A defects while their partner cooperates (DC), a so-called exploitative move. The next 
highest is mutual cooperation (CC) followed by mutual defection (DD). The lowest 
payout, the so-called “suckers” payout, occurs if Player A cooperates and their partner 
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defects (CD). Both players typically face the exact same payout structure which is usually 
presented in a matrix (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Example of payoff matrix for PD play 
 
The PD has traditionally been used to study the conditions under which 
cooperation arises. The optimal outcome is for both players to cooperate (CC). Given the 
logic of the game, this move generates the most income overall and an equal or fair 
division of that payout. The evolutionary logic that underlies the game is that each person 
sacrifices the chance to earn the highest amount for themselves in order to create value 
(the highest total payout) and fairness. Dyads that are able to make this combined move 
tend to “survive” in mathematical models of evolutionary dynamics (Nowak, 2006). 
However, the cooperative move by each individual entails a risk – the partner could 
defect, leaving Player A with the suckers payout and decreasing their chances of survival 
(in the evolutionary games). Given this risk, when players in the PD interact only once, 
they tend to choose defection. 
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Several factors can improve the chances of cooperation in the PD, but the main 
one of interest here is repeated play with the same partner. In the Repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (RPD), partners play multiple rounds together, a scenario more similar to real-
life, dyadic interactions. Repetition can lead to more cooperation but this depends on the 
probability of continuation, of playing another round with that partner. A longer number 
of rounds increases the probability that a player will cooperate, even in the first round of 
play. This so-called “shadow of the future” effect has been demonstrated in mathematical 
models (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; 1993; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986) and also in live 
games with adults (Dal Bó, 2005; Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011) and children (Blake et al., 
2015).  
Within an RPD, different forms of reciprocity, or “strategies” can arise which 
define how a particular individual plays the game. Some strategies are fixed – a player 
always cooperates or always defects – but most are conditional to some extent on the 
players’ decisions in prior rounds. In the most commonly known strategy, Tit-for-Tat 
(TFT), the player cooperates on the first move and then matches their partner’s last move 
on each subsequent round. Strategies can become increasingly complex in evolutionary 
models, but adults tend toward very basic strategies (Fudenberg, Rand & Dreber, 2012) 
and only a few will be examined in this thesis (see Chapter 3 and 4). 
 
The use of strategic games to study psychopathology 
Strategic games are starting to be recognized as useful measures for exploring 
social decisions and behaviors for clinical populations (King-Casas & Chiu, 2012) 
		 18	
including people with autism (Sally & Hill, 2006), anxiety and mood disorder (McClure 
et al., 2007; 2011; Rodebaugh et al., 2013), antisocial personality disorder (Rada, de 
Lucas Taracena, & Rodriguez, 2003), depression (Clark, Thorne, Hardy & Cropsey, 
2013), psychopathy (Morkos et al., 2008, Rilling et al., 2007) and conduct problems 
(Sharp et al., 2011). However, only a few of these studies use repeated games or multi-
move games and most are with adults. 
To date, only a handful of studies have used the RPD and similar interactive 
economic games (i.e.,, Trust Game) to study psychopathology in adolescents and children 
(Sharp, 2012), yet the results have been promising. For example, anxious adolescents 
playing an RPD were found to be more cooperative than healthy controls both after 
partner cooperation (McClure et al., 2007) and partner defection (McClure-Tone et al., 
2011), suggesting a greater desire to establish and maintain positive interactions. By 
contrast, adolescents from a community sample with higher externalizing problems were 
more likely to defect and take advantage of a partner’s cooperation (Sharp et al., 2011). 
One study testing several economic games, including the RPD, in children with autism 
spectrum disorder found some differences in strategies used by this group compared to 
typically developing controls (Sally & Hill, 2006), but the overall sample was small.  
More recently, using a novel, child-friendly interface for the RPD, Blake et al. (2015) 
found that middle-schoolers who scored in the abnormal range of the Conduct Problems 
sub-scale of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997) 
cooperated less after their partner’s defection. Children with no conduct problems on the 
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other hand were more likely to re-established cooperation both after the partner’s 
defection and after they had exploited the partner (DC) in the last round.  
Combined, these results suggest that RPD can elicit safe negative interactions 
driven by real incentives and can be used as a live, child-friendly measure of social 
interactions. Because children engage in contingent behavior in the RPD game (Blake et 
al., 2015), the task provides an opportunity to investigate how negative behaviors evolve 
over the course of the interaction. These modulations can be detected through different 
strategies and patterns of play throughout the game. Thus, by linking play strategies in 
the RPD game with reactive and proactive behavior outside the game, much can be 
learned about how children showing different types of aggression modulate their 
behavior in social interactions with different kinds of partners.  
The RPD thus addresses several of the limitations described for other tools used 
to study social interactions: 1) it allows for direct measure of behavior in a real and 
incentivized interaction; 2) unlike vignette-based measures which only describe one 
action and allow one response, the RPD allows for multiple inputs from the partner and 
multiple responses over the course of the game; 3) unlike other games the RPD allows for 
varied inputs (both negative and positive) from both the partner and the participant and 
thus makes investigation of negative interactions possible beyond the immediate response 
following provocation; 4) finally, as opposed to other competitive tasks (e.g., 
Waschbusch et al., 2002) in which the player only gets feedback from the partner when 
they lose, RPD is a more dynamic and realistic interaction where the signal from the 
partner is ongoing. 
		 20	
However, existing versions of the RPD for children have limitations. Most have 
used live play between children mirroring games done with adults, which includes 
random pairing of players. This limits control over the experience that each child has. To 
address this limitation, some tasks have used standard strategies, for example Sally and 
Hill (2006) used the TFT strategy played by a confederate. But this too limits ability to 
test how different children respond to similar behaviors by a partner.  For example, a TFT 
partner starts by cooperating and then mirrors the child’s decisions, so any defection in 
the game must be initiated by the child.  This means that children who also play TFT will 
never experience partner defection whereas a child who defects may end up in a cycle of 
defection with the partner. To properly address this limitation the development of a novel 
version of RPD is needed in which fixed patterns of play are designed to create key 
circumstances for testing responses. There is also need for testing this novel approach to 
ensure that children engage in strategic play when the play-partner does not act 
contingently (follows a fixed sequence of decisions regardless of what the child’s moves 
are). Another limitation of current RPD tasks is that little is known about how children 
construe the interaction and what kind of cognitions lead to their decisions in the game. 
When asked about their PD interactions, adults provide responses that describe strategic 
play (Fudenberg et al., 2012), but to our knowledge there is no such previous data for 
kids. A key goal of this dissertation was the development and validation of a new RPD 
that addresses these limitations. 
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The Present Research 
This dissertation integrates approaches from developmental psychology and 
behavioral economics and game theory to accomplish the following goals: 1) to 
understand how children interpret the repeated RPD interaction and what meanings they 
attribute to their own and their partner’s decisions in the game (Chapter 3); 2) to use the 
RPD task to investigate the reactive and proactive aggressive behavioral phenotypes by 
predicting different patterns of play in the RPD for each form of aggression (Chapter 4); 
and 3) to expand the SIP model to novel positive interaction vignettes and assess whether 
a) negative and positive responses are generated in ways expected by SIP and whether b) 
the SIP results can explain positive and negative behavior in the RPD (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 3 shows evidence that the RPD task can be used as a minimal, 
quantifiable social interaction with children. The task elicits rich social cognitions, and 
can be used to measure patterns of social behavior through strategies of play. Classes of 
motivations such as interpersonal and strategic self-interest predicted RPD behavior. 
Chapter 4 shows that RPD measurements can be applied to aggressive behavior, and that 
decisions in the RPD task can reveal new aspects of the reactive aggression in social 
interactions: that high-reactive children followed a game-theoretic strategy known as 
GRIM – they did not return to cooperation after partner defection. Finally, Chapter 5 
describes how responses to positive interaction scenarios were consistent with the SIP 
model but did not predict RPD play, offering partial evidence to the hypothesis that 
cognitive mechanisms that have been used to explain the occurrence of aggressive 
behavior can be extended to explain positive social behaviors like reciprocity as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PARTICIPANTS, METHODS AND MEASURES: DEVELOPING A FIXED 
STRATEGY RPD TASK FOR CHILDREN AND EXTENDING THE SIP 
MEASURE FOR POSITIVE INTERACTIONS 
 
To study both positive and negative interactions by combining approaches from 
developmental psychology and behavioral economics, we redesigned the classical RPD 
and SIP measures. The novel versions add key features, such as partners with fixed 
strategies for the RPD, and positive-outcome vignettes for the SIP measure. Fixed 
strategy partners allow for a standardized experience in the game as well as tests of 
responses to particular patterns of play; the positive-outcome SIP vignettes enable the 
testing of the SIP model for positive social behaviors, and possible connections with the 
RPD measure could validate the model for cooperative social interactions. This chapter 
describes the measures, the study procedure and the study participants. 
 
Participants 
Children between the ages of 9 and 11 (N = 167, Females = 82) participated in 
this study either online, from home (N = 109), or online at school (N = 58), in their 
classes.  Children were tested in schools, in the presence of an experimenter, to check for 
differences between home and school online play and to confirm that children 
participating from home were engaging with the task in the same way. Students at two 
US elementary schools participated in the study: a technology charter school serving a 
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generally low SES community and mostly minority children (N = 22), and a private 
school for gifted children (N = 36) from upper middle class highly educated families. 
Both schools focused on children gaining experience in using computers as early as the 
first grade, and both schools were able to provide laptops for students to access the online 
testing platform. Children who participated online from home were recruited through a 
database of families who had previously participated in research in our university’s Child 
Development Labs. These families tend to be upper middle class and highly educated 
similar to those served by the private school mentioned above. Parent consent was 
obtained prior to testing, either through the online testing platform (for children 
participating from home) or through a written consent form sent home to the parents (for 
children who participated from school). Child assent was obtained through the online 
testing platform.  All consent, measures and experimental procedures were approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at Boston University (IRB #3934E). 
The overall mean age was 9.96 years (SD = 0.83). We selected this age range 
because previous studies suggest that at ages 9 through 11 children are able to play the 
PD game in a strategic way: making intentional contingent decisions and being able to 
modulate these decisions based on those of the partner (Blake et al., 2015; Matsumoto et 
al., 1986; Perner, 1979). Also, for most children, this period marks the end of the 
transition from physical manifestations of aggression to social manifestations of 
aggression (Vitaro et al., 2006), the latter being the focus of this study. An additional 7 
children did not finish the study or data was not recorded due to technical errors. 
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Procedure 
For those children who participated from home, all the measures were 
administered online. Following informed consent parents reported on their child’s 
aggressive behaviors by answering the Parent Rating Scale for Reactive and Proactive 
Aggression (PRPA; Kempes et al., 2006). Parents were then asked via text instructions to 
help get their child set up at the computer. For children who participated in school, 
consent forms were sent home to the parents and later retrieved with the help of the 
teachers. On the testing day, an experimenter helped children to get set up at the 
computer and access the online data collection platform, and remained in the classroom 
for assistance for the duration of the testing. All children had to give their assent to 
participate on their computers to be able to access the online measures. 
Children first completed the SIP measure (described in detail below) through the 
online platform, including vignettes with both negative and positive outcomes. After 
reading each vignette children answered questions related to the SIP steps. 
Following the SIP measure, children were introduced to the RPD game. In order 
to incentivize them to take the game seriously, children were shown a variety of e-gift 
prizes (games, e-books, etc.) and were told that they could use the points earned in the 
game to choose and redeem some prizes. After practice trials and comprehension checks 
for the RPD (see details in Appendix A), children played three RPD games against 
different partners. Children were told that they were being connected online to other 
participants. Children who participated in schools were led to believe that they would be 
playing against children accessing the study from their homes. Unbeknownst to the 
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children, partners were pre-programmed algorithms using a particular strategy during the 
game: a TFT partner, a mostly cooperative partner, and a mostly non-cooperative partner. 
After playing with all three partners, children answered questions about how they and 
their partner played the game. Based on the number of points earned in the game, 
children selected prizes at the end, which were sent to their parents’ e-mails for 
redeeming.  After the experiment ended, parents were sent a debriefing form describing 
the deception in the game (the partner was not a real child) and why it was necessary.  In 
the schools, the debriefing was done by the experimenter who then lead a discussion 
about why the deception was needed. 
 
Measures 
The SIP questionnaire 
The standard SIP questionnaires consist of vignettes that describe negative 
interactions and outcomes followed by questions about the different steps in processing 
this social information. We focused on three of the five SIP steps: interpreting the 
situation by attributing intent, generating possible behavioral responses and evaluating 
the responses, since these are the steps that have primarily been used to distinguish 
between different types of aggression, reactive and proactive, and because these steps 
were feasible to test with a multiple-choice questionnaire, delivered in written format. We 
designed a similar questionnaire drawing examples from various other SIP assessments 
(Bell, Luebbe, Swenson, & Allwoold, 2009; Camodeca & Goossens, 2005; Flood, Hare, 
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& Wallis, 2011; van Rest, van Bokhoven, van Nieuwenhuijzen, Embregts, Vriens, & 
Matthys, 2014; see Appendix C).  
Three negative vignettes were used, depicting three interactions in which another 
child produced a negative outcome for the participant (muddy homework, dropped ice-
cream and tripping). In the tradition of the SIP questionnaires, the action was presented in 
an ambiguous way, and the child was asked to interpret whether the outcome was 
accidental or intentional by indicating whether the child in the story did it on purpose and 
whether the child was trying to be mean. Then the participant was asked how likely it 
was for them to respond aggressively in that situation by saying or doing something mean 
to the perpetrator. We asked the participants both about an immediate response (“right 
away”) and a distant one (“in the future”). Finally, inspired by measures designed by 
Camodeca and Goossens (2005), and Kupersmidt et al. (2011) we asked participants to 
evaluate a potential aggressive response (both an immediate and a distant one) in terms of 
how easy it would be for them to respond aggressively (self-efficacy), the consequences 
of the response (how well things would turn out if they responded aggressively) and how 
morally acceptable an aggressive response would be (would it be good or bad to act 
aggressively).  
In addition to these negative stories, we also created three novel positive stories, 
which allow the same questions to be asked. Similarly, these stories presented an 
ambiguous interaction in which another child produced a positive outcome for the 
participant (a wanted object is brought close to the participant, a ball is kicked in the 
participant’s direction as they are contemplating joining the game, and a seat is made 
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available when the participant needs it). Participants were asked whether the actions in 
the stories were accidental or intentional. Then they were asked about the likelihood of 
responding positively (right away or in the future) by doing or saying something nice to 
the other kid involved in the interaction. Finally, mirroring the negative vignettes, 
participants were asked to evaluate a potential positive response in terms of the ease of 
carrying it out, the consequences and the moral value of such a response. 
All responses were given on a four point Likert scale and scores for intent 
attribution, response generation and the three dimensions of response evaluation (self-
efficacy/ease, consequences, and moral acceptability/value) were calculated by averaging 
the responses to the questions corresponding to them separately for the negative and 
positive vignettes. For example, answers for the questions: “How much do you think the 
kid did this on purpose?” and “How much do you think the kid was trying to be mean?”, 
which test for hostile attribution bias, were averaged together to create the hostile 
attribution score (for a list of all questions grouped under corresponding steps and the 
multiple choice answers see Appendix D). The minimum score possible was 0 and the 
maximum 3. 
We were unable to calculate positive intent attribution scores for 2 children and 
positive response scores for 2 children due to missing data. Missing data for 2 children 
also prevented the calculation of the response evaluation score for negative vignettes and 
missing data from 4 different children prevented the calculation of the response 
evaluation score for positive vignettes. 
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Reactive and Proactive Aggression Measure 
Aggression was measured through parent report. Parents responded to the 11-item 
Parent Rating Scale for Reactive and Proactive Aggression (PRPA) developed by 
Kempes et al. (2006) rating the frequency of behaviors described in the items for their 
child (never = 0; sometimes = 1, often = 2). Reactive aggression and proactive aggression 
scores were calculated according to questionnaire instructions. Given that we tested a 
community sample, the children were grouped into low and high aggression profiles 
based on a median split (see details in Appendix C). Due to missing data we were unable 
to compute the reactive aggression score for 14 children and the proactive aggression 
scores for 9 children. Out of these children 8 were missing scores for both proactive and 
reactive aggression. Thus for analyses involving only the reactive aggressive score, data 
from 153 children was used. For analyses involving only the proactive aggressive score 
data from 158 children was used. For analyses involving both reactive and proactive 
aggressive scores data from 152 children was used. 
Similar to previous studies (Kempes et al., 2006; Muñoz et al. 2008) we grouped 
children into different aggression groups. On the reactive aggression scale (6 items), 
scores ranged from 0 to 10 (max score of 12) with a median score of 3. Children below or 
equal to the median score (N = 95) were categorized as low reactive aggressive, while 
children whose score was above the median (N = 58) were categorized as high reactive 
aggressive. On the proactive aggression scale (5 items), scores ranged from 0 to 6 (max 
score of 10) with a median score of 1. Children who scored below or equal to the median 
versus above the median were categorized as low (N = 125) and high proactive 
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aggressive (N = 33), respectively. The relatively low size of the high proactive aggression 
group is consistent for studies using community samples (e.g., Bailey & Ostrov, 2008). 
Note that the two categories have unequal number of children because children obtaining 
a score equal to the median (reactive aggression: N = 19; proactive aggression: N = 47) 
were categorized as low reactive and proactive aggressive respectively. 
 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) game 
The RPD game was played using a novel online game platform (see Figure 2), 
modeled on a visual interface for the RPD that was used successfully with 10-11 year 
olds (Blake et al., 2015). The new version of the game used a similar interface but was 
created for easy online access, and designed as a pre-programmed partner game as 
opposed to a live, child-to-child game. The game was developed, pilot-tested in the lab 
with undergrads and improved over several months. 
Figure 2. Initial display of the RPD game board 
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In the RPD game task, children faced a situation in which they had to either 
cooperate (C) with their play partner or defect (D). To avoid priming the children, the 
task was never described as a cooperation task and the actions in the game were never 
referred to as cooperating or defecting. Instead, the visual interface presented two buttons 
labeled Push and Pull, representing the cooperative and defecting moves, respectively.  
If the child clicked Push, 3 coins were delivered to the partner and the one coin 
closer to them fell into the “abyss,” a red zone in the middle into which coins fell and 
then disappeared.  Clicking Pull resulted in the 3 coins on the far side falling into the 
abyss and the one coin delivered to the child. This set-up mirrored the classical payoff 
matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 
Figure 3. Action options in the RPD game  
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If both children cooperated, they each received 3 points.  However, if one player 
defected and the other cooperated, the defector got 4 points and the cooperator got 0 
points. Thus, the child had an incentive to defect, but if both partners defected, they each 
got 1 point. Decisions in the game were made simultaneously by the two players (child 
and programmed partner) and the consequences of all decisions were made visually 
obvious and intuitive. The numeric outcomes of each round were shown on screen and 
added to a running point total at the top of the screen.  
 
Figure 4.  Outcomes in the RPD game 
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Children played a total of three RPD games, each against a new, anonymous 
partner for ten rounds with each partner. The partners in the game were pre-programmed 
strategies, partly based on prior research with adults and designed to elicit different 
responses from the children.  However, children were told that each partner was another 
child. The first partner used a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy which cooperates in the first 
round and then mirrors the child’s decision in the prior round: cooperating if the child 
cooperated on the previous round, or defecting if the child defected on the previous 
round. The next two partners were counterbalanced across participants. One partner 
cooperated 80% (80C) of the time, defecting on rounds 3 and 7. A third partner defected 
80% (80D) of the time, cooperating on rounds 3 and 7. There were ten rounds for each 
partner to allow for a mix of C and D trials in the case of the fixed strategy partners. The 
final round was announced in each game in order to give children the opportunity to 
defect in the final round, a typical strategic move from game theory. 
The order of the three partners was partially counterbalanced. The TFT partner 
was always first, followed by either 80D or 80C. Playing against a TFT partner was 
meant to capture the child’s baseline play strategies, since this partner was programmed 
to simply “react” to one’s decisions on the previous round. The 80D and 80C partners 
were designed to “provoke” through their play strategies and elicit both cooperation or 
defection.  
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Motivations to cooperate or defect in the RPD 
After playing all of the RPD games, children answered three open-ended 
questions about their own decisions and those of their partner. The questions were 
designed to elicit their spontaneous thoughts about the game, focusing on what motivated 
cooperation (push) and defection (pull) decisions. One question focused on the child’s 
own play: 
1. We are interested in how you played the game.  Please describe why you 
clicked the push and the pull buttons. 
This question asks about both cooperation and defection since it is possible that 
some children only use one of the two options. Two separate questions were asked about 
children’s perceptions of their partner’s motivations to defect and cooperate: 
2. Sometimes your partner pressed “pull”. Why do you think they did that? 
3. Sometimes your partner pressed “push”. Why do you think they did that? 
These three questions appeared in a fixed order for all children. 
 
Stated goals for the RPD game 
Children next answered a multiple choice question which was intended to capture 
their goals for the game, as well as secondary motivations that they might have not 
offered spontaneously: 
People think about different things when they play this game.  We are interested 
in what you were thinking about when playing.  Please check all of the boxes that 
describe your thoughts during the game: 
		 34	
a) I wanted to win as many total points as possible  
b) I wanted to win points every round  
c) I wanted to win more points than the other kid  
d) I wanted to help the other kid win points  
e) I wanted to punish or reward the other kid for their choices  
f) I had no particular reason in mind. I just pushed the buttons randomly  
Since the RPD game is designed to pit different goals against each other, children 
were allowed to select more than one answer. The answers were inspired by work with 
adults  (Dreber, Fudenberg, & Rand, 2014), and were meant to capture the following 
goals: maximizing one’s own gain, loss avoidance, competition, prosociality, and 
reciprocity. 
The following chapters show how these measures were combined and used to 
investigate different aspects of social interactions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MOTIVATIONS, DECISIONS AND STRATEGIES IN THE REPEATED 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME 
 
Although extensively researched in adult experiments, the RPD has only been 
used with children in a small number of studies (e.g., Blake et al., 2015; Matsumoto, 
Haan, Yabrove, Theodorou, & Cooke Carney, 1986; Sally & Hill, 2006). The game 
establishes a minimal social interaction suitable for studying social behaviors, but little is 
known about how children construe this interaction and what kind of cognitions lead to 
their decisions in the game.  Also, the dynamics of the game and strategies of play have 
only recently begun to be explored with children (Blake et al., 2015). This chapter 
presents findings on how children’s self-described motivations in the game relate to their 
cooperative behavior, and how children’s decision patterns resemble standard strategies 
from game theory. 
Although many studies have tried to infer motivations in strategic games using 
clever experimental manipulations (see review by Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002), 
very few have explored directly how people think of these games by asking them to 
explain their decisions. Examining people’s stated motivations can offer a wealth of 
information about how the task is construed, and whether it elicits the types of social 
cognitions that researchers are trying to investigate. Dreber et al. (2014) have studied 
when and why adults cooperate in the RPD in this direct way. They asked participants to 
indicate how likely they would be to cooperate based on the outcomes in the previous 
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round, and their motivations for cooperating. They found that, for adults, earning the 
most points in the long run was the most important motivation for cooperating in the 
game.  
To our knowledge, no studies have simply asked children how they play the RPD 
and about their motivations for different decisions. One study by Sharp et al. (2011) did 
ask children about their decisions in a related game, the Trust Game. This game involves 
two players, one of whom (the investor) makes a first move, deciding whether to keep 
money or pass it on to a trustee. The money sent would get tripled and the trustee would 
then decide how much money to send back to the investor. Boys with and without 
externalizing behavior problems played the trust game and were asked to explain what 
motivated their decisions in the game. Responses, as well as actual decisions, revealed 
that children with externalizing problems were both less trusting and less trustworthy. 
The RPD game originated in the context of game theory and has been used to 
study mathematical models of how cooperation emerges between rational decision-
makers. A wide variety of strategies have been extensively tested in tournaments where 
computer algorithms (defined by the different strategies) play against each other. In the 
most famous of these tournaments (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), TFT emerged as the 
winner against far more complicated strategies. Research with adults shows that decision 
patterns in the RPD sometimes approximate those of the standard strategies from game 
theory (Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011; Dreber et al., 2014). By studying how and when 
people’s patterns of play align with these standard strategies, one can better understand 
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the social cognitions that drive their behavior, such as forgiveness, leniency and 
exploitation (Dreber et al., 2014). 
Approximation of standard game theoretic strategies has never been rigorously 
calculated for children’s play of the RPD, and it is not even clear that children 
consciously use particular strategies. One prior RPD study found suggestive evidence that 
girls and children with few conduct problems used a strategy similar to the Win-Stay-
Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy  (Blake et al., 2015).  In WSLS, players repeat their prior 
move (stay) if they earn either of the top two payouts (CC or DC), but change to the 
opposite move (shift) if they receive the bottom two payouts (DD or CD). In contrast to 
this result, boys and children with conduct problems appeared to follow a GRIM strategy. 
For GRIM, players cooperate until the partner defects and then they defect continuously, 
never attempting cooperation with that partner. While this strategy appeared plausible, 
the high use of ALL-D (always defect) may have distorted the results given the small 
sample. Further, no formal calculations were done to determine how closely these 
strategies were followed. 
Given the limited data on how children understand strategic games, we included 
questions after children had played all of the RPD games. Specifically, we asked how 
they approached the task, what their own motivations were, and what they believed about 
the partner’s motivations. These questions were intended to provide a critical validation 
that a) children view the RPD as a real social interaction, b) their explicit thoughts about 
the game would predict actual decisions in the game c) they actually think strategically 
about their decisions. As validation of strategic thinking, we analyzed how well 
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children’s patterns of play aligned with three standard game-theoretic strategies in the 
RPD: TFT, WSLS and GRIM. 
 
Results 
Children’s motivations for cooperating or defecting in the RPD  
Children expressed a variety of motivations for both cooperating and defecting 
and identified similar motivations for the decisions of their partners in the game. Many of 
the motivations expressed by children matched well-studied factors that have been shown 
to modulate responses in PD games with adults (Kopelman et al., 2002). The RPD game, 
by design creates a situation in which motivations such as self-interest, get pitted against 
the need for establishing interpersonal cooperation by working together with the partner. 
Sometimes, self-interest can even give way to prosocial motivations, such as the desire to 
help the other player win points or achieve an equal outcome. The open-ended answers to 
our questions allowed us to capture diverse and rich nuances for all these different 
motivations.  
We coded the children’s answers for three main types of motivations: strategic 
self-interest, interpersonal or prosocial as well as motivation subtypes (see Table 1 and 
details about the coding scheme in Appendix B). Answers were assigned a code of 1 for 
each type or subtype of motivation the child mentioned and a code of 0 for the rest. 
Children who mentioned more that one motivation received a code of 1 for each type or 
subtype they mentioned. The answers were coded by two independent coders who were 
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blind to any other information about the child including, their age, gender and decisions 
in the game. Average Cohen’s kappa for inter-coder reliability was 0.72. 
 
Strategic self-interest   
Motivations indicating strategic self-interest appeared most often in children’s 
explanations of their decisions in the game (mentioned by 45.5% of children), and 
particularly in their explanations of the partner’s defection in the game (78.4%). A 
majority of children attributed strategic self-interest motivations to partner’s defection. 
 
Table 1. Children’s motivations for decisions in the game 
   
  
Child 
motivations 
Partner 
motivations 
      
Strategic self-interest 45.51% 81.44% 
Personal gain 40.71% 79.64% 
Freeriding 6.58% 6.58% 
 
  
Interpersonal 35.33% 37.12% 
Trust 3.59% 12.57% 
Reciprocity 22.75% 19.76% 
Fairness 11.37% 8.98% 
Joint gain 3.59% 9.58% 
   Prosocial 10.77% 50.30% 
   Random 2.99% 5.99% 
   Other 16.76% 19.76% 
      
* Percentages will not add up to 100% because some 
children mentioned multiple motivations 
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Two subtypes of strategic self-interest were identified: the desire to maximize 
personal gain and the intention to freeride, take advantage of the partner. While both have 
self-interest as the end goal, the latter focuses more on the interaction in the game. 
Personal gain. These answers focused on increasing personal gain through 
acquiring points, winning, or getting prizes. Eight responses referred to relative gain by 
preventing the partner from getting more points (e.g., “I clicked only the pull buttons 
because my partner would get more points if I clicked the push button”) and were also 
included in this category. Most children viewed defection as a way to increase personal 
gain, and only one child mentioned cooperation (push) as a sometimes better alternative 
to pulling (defection) for increasing one’s score: “I clicked pull because I’m always safe, 
either I get one point or four points. I clicked push because I could also get there, and 
that’s better than one.”  
Although all answers in this category focused on personal gain as a motivation, 
they differed in the degree to which personal advantage was at play. Some children used 
defection to get points when they were losing, as a way of catching up (e.g., “when I’m 
far behind I pull to give myself a boost”), others were extremely competitive and gain-
oriented (e.g., “I did pull a lot because GO BIG or GO HOME! And I never EVER 
lose!”). Kids also differed in their reasons for defecting on their partners, with some 
choosing it for safety (e.g., “I clicked pull so I got guaranteed points”) others as a way to 
get more points than the partner (e.g., “I wanted to get as many points as possible and get 
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more points than my partner”). Similarly, in attributing motivations to their partners, 
children identified personal gain as the main motivator for defection, some believing the 
partner defected “to get more points” while others felt the partner was defecting “so that 
they didn’t just get nothing, even if it was only one point”. Some children even attributed 
negative personality traits to their partners, such as greed, selfishness or being a cheater 
(e.g., “they were trying to be selfish (but I’m not being accusatory)”). Some children felt 
that partner’s defection was purposefully obstructive and meant to prevent them from 
winning (e.g., “to keep me from earning points” or “to be annoying”). 
Freeriding motivation. Some children focused on tricking or taking advantage of 
the partner as a motivation for decisions in the game (e.g., “I clicked the push button to 
lure my opponent into giving points to me and then I kept pulling.”) A small number of 
children (N = 2) even described defection in the last round, a well-studied move in game 
theory, as part of their strategy: “If they pushed, we would push until round ten, when I 
pulled because they could not do anything to take from me in a future round because it 
was the final.” Children also sometimes felt deceived or taken advantage of by their 
partners, with some children interpreting partner defection as an attempt at freeriding 
(e.g., “because I press push a lot so they wanted to get 4 points”).  
 
Interpersonal motivations 
Many children gave interpersonal motivations for their decisions (35.33%), both 
for cooperation and for defection, explaining their own decisions in relation to those of 
their partner. Children attributed interpersonal motivations to their partners as well 
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(37.12%), mostly when explaining partners’ cooperation. Interpersonal motivations were 
subdivided into four topics: trust, reciprocity, concern for fairness and joint gain. 
Trust. For some children trust was a reason for cooperating or defecting. Children 
mentioned trusting the partner or not (e.g., “we trusted each other we both clicked push 
every time”), wanting to make the partner trust them (e.g., “I usually kept pressing push 
to get my partner to trust me”) or they expressed the desire to use a decision to test the 
partner’s trustworthiness (e.g., “First, I always pressed push so I could see if my partner 
liked to share or didn’t”). Some children also felt that trust played a role in their partners’ 
decisions, with some partners cooperating “to help build trust”, others trying to gauge 
how trustworthy they were (e.g., “because he was testing me”), and some defecting 
because of lack of trust (e.g., “maybe they did not trust me to click push”). 
Reciprocity. Children mentioned engaging in both negative (e.g., “whenever 
someone pushed pull I would pull the next round to even the playing field”) and positive 
reciprocity (e.g., “if the person gave me 3 coins I give him/her back 3 coins”). Children 
mentioned both responding in kind to the partner (e.g., “I clicked pull to give me points 
when I saw the other person was pulling”) and trying to elicit a response in kind from the 
partner (e.g., “I clicked push so that my partner would give me some coins”). The 
answers children gave suggest that the situations in which they chose to reciprocate 
varied. Some children seemed to describe a pure TFT strategy (e.g., “I clicked whatever 
my partner clicked the round before”), other children resorted to responding in kind only 
after the partner’s repeated defections (e.g., “if they kept on doing pull I would switch to 
pull for a while”). Some answers suggested that reciprocity was a deviation from the 
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default decision (e.g., “I clicked push most of the time until my last partner clicked pull, 
pull, pull, pull and pushed once or twice it made me VERY MAD”, or “I only pushed if 
my partner did too”) and that they did not engage in perfect reciprocity across the game 
(e.g., “I wanted to get as many points as I could. If someone did something nice for me, I 
USUALLY paid them back”). 
Children felt that their partners also engaged in reciprocity. Children attributed 
positive reciprocity to their partners (17.36%) mentioning that the partner had cooperated 
in response to their own cooperation (e.g., “I think my partner pressed push because I 
pressed push a lot.”), or to try to elicit cooperation (e.g., “so that I would be nice in return 
and give them coins”). Only a small percentage (2.39%) of children felt that partner’s 
defection was in response to their own (e.g., “because I pulled so they wanted to get 
points so the next round they pulled because they thought I was being greedy”). 
Fairness. Some children’s answers suggested a preoccupation with playing a fair 
game. These answers focused on sharing and reaching an equal (or closer to equal) 
outcome as motivators for their decisions. Some children expressed a desire to have an 
equal amount of points with their partner (e.g., “I clicked both push and pull buttons and 
tried to make it so scores were the same and fair”) or for their scores to be more similar 
(e.g., “I would push sometimes when I was winning by a lot because I felt bad for them 
and so it would be a closer game”). Children viewed both cooperation and defection as a 
means to playing a fair game. Some children even mentioned taking turns defecting as a 
way to distribute points fairly (e.g., “I clicked pull when my partner clicked pull and we 
took turns giving each other coins”). Children also felt that their partners were concerned 
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with fairness, especially as a motivation for cooperation (e.g., “I think they agreed with 
my idea of both of us pressing push so it would be more fair”). 
Joint gain. A small percentage of children (3.59%) mentioned their decisions 
being motivated by joint benefit from collaboration. Few spontaneously mentioned that 
by working with their partner one could increase the amount of points jointly earned 
(e.g., “I wanted to get the most points but I needed my partner to help me. So I pushed 
my 3 to him and he pushed his 3 to me”). More children (9.58%) attributed joint gain as a 
motivator for partner cooperation (e.g., “So that we each get three points, everybody 
wins”). 
 
Prosocial motivations 
Prosocial motivations expressed by children were distinct from interpersonal ones 
because although the focus remained on the partner, they were not conditional on the 
partner’s decisions. Children who invoked prosocial motivations for cooperating 
mentioned empathy, generosity and the desire to be nice or to help the partner (e.g., “I 
wanted to be nice so I mostly clicked push”). In all of these instances cooperation was not 
intended to trick the partner or to determine the partner to cooperate. Answers indicate 
that the frequency of prosocial cooperation over rounds varied. Some children suggest 
that they cooperated most of the times, others that they were only sometimes compelled 
to cooperate as a gesture of kindness (e.g., “sometimes I felt nice and empathetic”). A 
large percentage of children (50.30%) interpreted their partners’ cooperation as having 
prosocial motivations, making this the main perceived motivation for partner cooperation. 
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Some children even suggested that the partner intended for them to win (e.g., “to help me 
win”). 
Finally, in addition to children mentioning strategic self-interest, interpersonal 
and prosocial motivations, there were also children who said that they made their 
decisions randomly (e.g., “I wanted to see what happens when you click either button”) 
and others gave nonsensical or non-informative answers like describing the rules of the 
game or what their decisions were but without explaining why. 
 
Motivations and decisions in the PD game 
To examine the relation between children’s motivations for their own decisions 
and their actual decisions in the PD game, we used a nested logistic regression model 
(Stata v.14.2). The PD game produces a binary decision in each round: Cooperate (coded 
as 1) or Defect (coded as 0), thus the use of logistic models. Each child played thirty 
rounds in total, which were treated as a repeated measure with rounds nested under each 
participant. The slopes and intercepts were allowed to vary for each participant with 
clustering of standard errors. The three main types of motivations: strategic self-interest, 
interpersonal and prosocial (coded as 1 if present in the child’s answers, 0 if absent) were 
introduced as independent variables in the model. Age (in years) and gender were 
introduced as covariates.  
On average children cooperated 35.7% of the times across partners. Children who 
mentioned interpersonal motivations for their decisions were significantly more likely to 
cooperate (Β = 0.951, p < 0.001) than those who did not (see Figure 5 and Table 2). The 
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likelihood of cooperation was significantly reduced for children who mentioned strategic 
self interest as a motivation for their decisions (Β = -0.568, p = 0.001). Prosocial 
motivations however were not significantly related to cooperation (Β = 0.219, p = 0.323). 
 
Figure 5. Motivations and overall cooperation in the RPD. The child’s stated motivations 
for their own decisions are on the left and their beliefs about the partner’s motivations are 
on the right. Average cooperation is included as a line for reference. 
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Table 2. Relations between children’s motivations and their decisions in the RPD 
                     
  Β   SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -2.867 
 
0.959** 
   Age 0.216 
 
0.096* 1.24 1.03 1.50 
Gender -0.052 
 
0.152 0.95 0.70 1.28 
Interpersonal motivations 0.951 
 
0.170*** 2.59 1.85 3.62 
Strategic self-interest -0.568 
 
0.172** 0.57 0.40 0.79 
Prosocial motivations 0.219 
 
0.222 1.24 0.81 1.92 
       
       Log Likelihood -3019.142 
     # Observations 5010 
     # Children/Clusters 167 
     χ2(df) 96.82(5) 
     Pseudo R2 0.08           
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	 	 	 	 	 
We also tested whether the more common motivation subtypes predicted the 
likelihood of cooperation. To avoid collinearity (remember that children sometimes 
mentioned multiple motivations) we used separate logistic models to test these predictors. 
Reciprocity, the most commonly mentioned interpersonal motivation significantly 
predicted an increased likelihood of cooperation (Β = 0.973, p < 0.001). This was true for 
both positive reciprocity (motivation to cooperate in response to partner cooperation; Β = 
0.493, p < 0.016) and negative reciprocity (motivation to defect in response to partner 
defection; Β = 1.266, p < 0.001). Fairness, the second most commonly mentioned 
interpersonal motivation was also significantly related to an increase in the likelihood of 
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cooperation (Β = 0.473, p = 0.022). Personal gain significantly predicted decreased 
cooperation (Β = -0.835, p < 0.001). 
Age was also a significant predictor of cooperation with older children being 
more likely to cooperate (Β = 0.215, p = 0.025). We also investigated whether age and 
gender were related to the types of motivations that the children mentioned for their own 
decisions. Older children mentioned interpersonal motivations more often (Β = 0.660, p = 
0.001) as well as prosocial motivations (Β = 0.659, p = 0.037) while there were no age 
differences in children mentioning strategic self-interest (Β = -0.116, p = 0.539).  
To examine how children’s decisions were impacted by the kinds of motivations 
they attributed to their partner we conducted a nested logistic regression with the partner 
motivations (strategic self-interest, interpersonal and prosocial) as independent variables 
(see Figure 1 and Table 3). Attributing interpersonal motivations to the partner increased 
the likelihood of cooperating with the partner (Β = 0.607, p = 0.001). Perceived strategic 
self-interest and prosocial motivations of the partner were not related to the child’s 
cooperation. We also found that with increase in age children attributed interpersonal 
motivations to their partner more often (Β = 0.889, p < 0.001) and that girls attributed 
more strategic self-interest to their partners than boys (Β = 1.232, p = 0.006). 
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Table 3. Relation between perceived partner’s motivations and children’s decisions in the 
RPD 
 
 
                    
  Β   SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -3.526 
 
1.063** 
   Age 0.263 
 
0.104* 1.30 1.06 1.60 
Gender 0.106 
 
0.168 1.11 0.80 1.55 
Interpersonal motivations 0.607 
 
0.188** 1.83 1.27 2.65 
Strategic self-interest -0.077 
 
0.243 0.93 0.58 1.49 
Prosocial motivations 0.159 
 
0.183 1.17 0.82 1.68 
       
       Log Likelihood -3174.652 
     # Observations 5010 
     # Children/Clusters 167 
     χ2(df) 25.8(5) 
     Pseudo R2 0.03           
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
Goals and decisions in the PD game 
To capture additional goals and motivations for the game, which children might  
have not offered spontaneously, we also asked children to identify their “thoughts during 
the game” from a pre-defined list of goals. Children could check multiple goals from the 
following list: maximizing one’s own gain (I wanted to win as many points as possible), 
loss avoidance (I wanted to win points every round), competition (I wanted to win more 
points than the other kid), prosociality (I wanted to help the other kid win points), and 
reciprocity (I wanted to punish or reward the other kid for their choices). Wanting to win 
as many total points as possible was the most popular goal that children adopted for the 
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game (68.07%) and 73.65% of the children selected multiple goals for the game (see 
Table 4). Out of the children who said they played randomly, only 5 selected no other 
goals. 
 
Table 4. Children’s goals for the RPD 
      
Goal selected N % Children  
I wanted to win as many total points as possible 113 68.07% 
I wanted to win points every round 85 51.20% 
I wanted to win more points than the other kid 68 40.72% 
I wanted to help the other kid win points 76 45.50% 
I wanted to punish or reward the other kid for their choices 40 23.95% 
I just pushed the buttons randomly 31 18.56% 
   Children who selected more than one goal 123 73.65% 
		 		 		
	 	 	 
To investigate the relation between children’s goals for the game and their actual 
decisions in the game we used another nested logistic regression model, with decisions in 
the game as the dependent variable and children’s goals as independent variables (see 
Table 5). Children who wanted to win more points than their partner were significantly 
less likely to cooperate (Β = -0.711, p < 0.001). Children were more likely to cooperate if 
they wanted to help their partner win points (Β = 0.898, p < 0.001) and if they wanted to 
punish or reward the other child for their choices (Β = 0.699, p < 0.001). 
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Table 5. Relation between children’s goals and decisions in the RPD 
 
              
  Β   SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -2.845 
 
0.974** 
   Age 0.209 
 
0.092* 1.23 1.03 1.48 
Gender 0.061 
 
0.149 1.06 0.79 1.42 
win as many points as possible -0.096 
 
0.153 0.91 0.67 1.22 
win points every round -0.271 
 
0.159 0.76 0.56 1.04 
win more points than the other kid -0.711 
 
0.171*** 0.49 0.35 0.69 
help the other kid win points 0.898 
 
0.148*** 2.45 1.84 3.28 
punish or reward the other kid 0.699 
 
0.141*** 2.01 1.53 2.65 
push buttons randomly -0.169 
 
0.166 0.84 0.61 1.17 
       
       Log Likelihood -2931.433 
     # Observations 4980 
     # Children/Clusters 166 
     χ2(df) 93.97(8) 
     Pseudo R2 0.10           
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
      
 
Standard game theoretic strategies and children’s RPD play 
In addition to children’s verbal descriptions of their play we also analyzed 
children’s patterns of play in relation to three standard game theoretic strategies: TFT, 
WSLS and GRIM. First we investigated whether the game theoretic strategies would 
explain children’s decisions in the game. For each round we determined what a pure TFT, 
WSLS or GRIM player would do, cooperate (coded as 1) or defect (coded as 0), given the 
partner’s decisions up to that round. The pure TFT cooperates on the first round and then 
responds in kind to the partner’s last move. The pure WSLS repeats their prior decision 
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(cooperate or defect) as long as they are “winning” (gaining 3 or 4 points) and changes 
their decision if they “lose” (gaining 1 or 0 points). The pure GRIM cooperates until the 
partner defects and then defects for the remainder of the game. We used the decisions of 
these pure strategies as independent variables in nested regression models to predict 
children’s decisions, which was our dependent variable. Recall that each game consisted 
of 30 rounds, which were treated as repeated measures nested under each child. The 
slopes and intercepts were allowed to vary for each participant with clustering of standard 
errors.  
 
Table 6. Standard strategies from game theory as predictors for play patterns 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) 
Intercept -4.29(0.98)*** -5.02(0.98)*** -4.67(1.00)*** -4.60(0.97)*** -5.44(0.96)*** 
Age 0.37(0.10)*** 0.36(0.09)*** 0.36 (0.10)*** 0.35(0.10)*** 0.34(0.10)*** 
Gender 0.10(0.98)*** 0.09(0.16) 0.10(0.17) 0.11(0.17) 0.11(0.16) 
TFT 
 
1.28(0.11)*** 
  
1.20(0.13)*** 
WSLS 
  
0.65(0.08)*** 
 
0.80(0.10)*** 
GRIM 
   
1.34(0.10)*** 0.49(0.10)*** 
      
      N 167 167 167 167 167 
LL -3214.19 -3007.15 -3160.24 -3008.11 -2884.25 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.079 0.033 0.079 0.117 
AIC 6434.38 6022.29 6328.49 6024.22 5780.51 
BIC 6443.73 6034.77 6340.96 6036.69 5799.21 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	 	 	 
All standard game theoretic strategies significantly predicted children’s decisions 
(TFT: Β = 1.201, p < 0.001; WSLS: Β = 0.801, p < 0.001; GRIM: Β = 0.494, p < 0.001), 
		 53	
which means children were more likely to cooperate on those rounds on which each of 
the standard strategies would cooperate. Moreover the model fit was improved by 
introducing the standard strategies as predictors (see Table 6). Model 1 is the null model 
with age and gender as covariates. The model fit is improved in Models 2, 3 and 4 that 
have the TFT, WSLS and GRIM strategies respectively as independent variables. Finally, 
Model 4, when all the strategies are introduced as independent variables, shows the best 
model fit. The model best fitting the data included all three standard strategies as 
predictors. This indicates that children played the RPD strategically, significantly 
approximating standard strategies from game theory. 
We also wanted to estimate how well children’s patterns of play matched these 
standard strategies and whether closeness to a certain strategy was dependent on the 
child’s age and gender. We computed to what extent children’s patterns of play matched 
each of the three standard strategies by comparing, for each round, the child’s decision to 
the decisions generated by the strategy. When the child’s decision was identical to that of 
the strategy, the match to that strategy, for that round, was coded as 1, when their 
decision did not match, it was coded as 0. Decisions in the game matched the TFT 
strategy on 62% of the rounds for all children combined, the WSLS strategy on 54% of 
the rounds and the GRIM strategy 69% of the rounds. 10.1 % of children adopted a 
perfect ALL-D strategy and defected throughout the entire game. 
To investigate the influence of age and gender on the extent to which children’s 
play patterns approximated classical strategies in the PD game, we used nested logistic 
regression models. Age and gender were the predictors in the models. We constructed 
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one model for each standard strategy tested. The dependent variable was the child’s 
match to the strategy (coded as 1 for match, 0 for no match) on each round. Age was a 
significant predictor of TFT strategy match, with play patterns getting closer to the TFT 
strategy with increased age (Β = 0.235, p < 0.001). Age and gender did not significantly 
predict the extent to which play patterns matched the WSLS and GRIM strategies. 
 
Discussion 
The results confirmed our first two hypotheses that a) children understood the 
RPD as a real social interaction and b) children explicitly engaged in strategic thinking 
during the game. Children’s open-ended descriptions of their thoughts during the game 
revealed that they not only had clear ideas about their own motivations and goals but that 
they also formed beliefs about the partner’s motivations and goals. This is striking given 
the minimal nature of the interaction. Most strategic games, including the RPD version 
designed for this study, are played online and the partners remain anonymous. To 
minimize noise in the data, the only means of interacting are through the decisions in the 
game. Thus the child never sees the partner, is never told anything about who the partner 
is besides that it is another child like them, and never gets to communicate with the 
partner in any other way. In fact in our study children were led to believe they were 
playing another child online, while they were actually playing against pre-programmed 
algorithms. Despite the minimal information provided, children generated rich 
descriptions of the partner’s motivations and their own strategies for playing. These 
descriptive results provide an important validation of the RPD as a rigorous, easily 
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quantifiable measure of social interactions through which complex social phenomena like 
trust, reciprocity, fairness, etc. can be studied with children. 
The study also shows that children’s stated motivations were linked to their 
behaviors in the game. Dreber et al. (2014) found that adults’ cooperation in repeated 
games was primarily motivated by payoff maximization in the long run. Children too, 
like adults, had the goal of maximizing their gain: 68% of the children endorsed the 
statement: “I wanted to win as many total points as possible.”  However this goal did not 
predict their level of cooperation in the game. In fact, focusing on strategic self-interest 
was related to decreased cooperation. By contrast, interpersonal motivations (attending to 
the partner and responding to the partner’s decisions) was positively related to 
cooperation in the RPD. Also, children cooperated more when they perceived the 
partner’s motivations as being interpersonal. 
This distinction between adults and children could indicate that, overall, children 
lacked the intuition that sustained cooperation between partners would be beneficial for 
maximizing point gain in the long run. Indeed, this interpretation is supported by the fact 
that only a small minority of children spontaneously mentioned joint gain as a motivation 
for their decisions. The way children perceived their partner’s motivations in the game is 
also telling – they rarely mentioned personal gain as a motivation for partner cooperation.  
It is intriguing however to note that older, but not younger, children were more 
likely to mention interpersonal motivations and they were also more likely to cooperate 
in the RPD. It is possible that older children view interpersonal motivations, being 
mindful of the partner’s decisions, as a means to winning more points in the long run. 
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This interpretation aligns, at least qualitatively, with the increased use of a TFT strategy 
with age. 
One possibility why children were overall less likely to think of cooperation as a 
way to increasing personal gain might be related to the way the game was set up. In our 
game cooperation was achieved by the act of delivering three coins to the partner by 
pushing. This could be construed as an act of giving. Defection was achieved by the act 
of pulling one coin towards oneself which could be construed as taking. It is more 
counter-intuitive to think that one would maximize their gain by giving something away. 
Previous research has also shown that the framing of strategic games (for example in 
terms of giving and taking or keeping and leaving) can impact decisions and strategies in 
the game (see review by Kopelman et al., 2002). 
Our last hypothesis concerned children’s use of game-theoretic strategies in the 
RPD. Most children engaged in both cooperation and defection in the RPD in agreement 
with game theoretical predictions for repeated games (Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011). Only 
10.1 % of children defected throughout the entire game, similar to results from adult 
studies (Fudenberg, Rand, & Dreber, 2012). Decisions for the remainder of the children 
were predicted by three “pure” strategies: TFT, WSLS and GRIM. This suggests that 
when making new decisions in the game children take into account the history of the 
interaction. Standard game-theoretic strategies specify which decision should be made 
given the history of the game. For example, cooperation in TFT depends on the partner’s 
decision in the previous round, cooperation in WSLS depends on the payoff from the 
previous round, and cooperation in GRIM depends on the partner’s cooperation up to the 
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first defection. Overall, children’s play strategies were closest to GRIM, even closer than 
ALL-D, (match to GRIM: 69% of rounds, match to ALL-D: 64.3%), suggesting that 
children are responsive to partner defection. Of the more cooperative standard strategies, 
children were closer to TFT than WSLS. Also children’s patterns of play approximated 
TFT significantly more closely as a function of age: older children’s play resembled TFT 
more. TFT is a responsive and reciprocal strategy – the player starts by cooperating and 
then responds in kind to the partner’s decision in the previous round. This is in agreement 
with our finding that older children report more interpersonal motivations and thus more 
attention to partner’s decisions in the game. 
There are several limitations to this study that should be addressed in future 
research. First, we asked about motivations for decisions in the game only after the 
children had played against three different partners. The motivations might have been 
different for each individual partner. Future studies should investigate how motivations in 
the game might be affected by different kinds of partners: generally cooperative partners, 
generally selfish partners, forgiving partners, lenient partners, contingent responders etc. 
The perceived motivations of the partner are also likely to differ based on the partner’s 
pattern of play.  
Second, we did not ask about motivations in specific situations: following partner 
cooperation and defection, following mutual cooperation, mutual defection or 
exploitation of or by the partner. Again, motivations might differ based on the different 
circumstances and this might be relevant for how children construe the interaction in 
these different situations. Third, patterns of play in the game should be compared to other 
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versions of standard game theoretic strategies, like 2TFT in which the player defects 
twice in response to a defection from the partner (see an extended list in Fudenberg et al., 
2012). 
Finally, different factors such as background and ethnicity might influence 
children’s interpretations of other player’s actions. For example, children from minority 
groups may interpret the other player’s actions as being more hostile. It is thus important 
to understand what external factors might be influencing children’s motivations in the 
game. 
In summary, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it 
shows that children construe the RPD as a social interaction. Second, it shows that 
children’s motivations in the game are related to sophisticated social cognitions and that 
these motivations influence their decisions in the game. Third, our study shows that 
children’s decisions in the game also depend on the perceived motivations of the partner: 
perceived interpersonal motivations of the partner increase the likelihood of cooperation. 
Lastly, the study shows that children play in strategic ways according to game theory and 
that both interpersonal motivations and more responsive strategies (more similar to TFT) 
increase with age. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS: SIGNATURES OF AGGRESSION IN  
PRISONER’S DILEMMA PLAY 
 
Strategic games have been recognized as useful tools for studying behavioral 
profiles and psychopathologies (King-Casas & Chiu, 2012). However, reactive and 
proactive forms of aggression have been primarily researched using questionnaire 
measures. Questionnaire-based measures are useful for identifying children with reactive 
and proactive traits, and these are indeed predictive of child outcomes. Child 
questionnaires based on responses to vignettes, as in the SIP model, have also proven 
useful in identifying the thought processes that might lead to aggressive responses. Yet 
these kinds of measures are also limited in that they do not allow us to study aggression 
as it occurs. 
Some researchers have tried to rectify this issue by using computerized games that 
create provocation situations and allow measurement of the responses of aggressive 
individuals. These approaches, reviewed in Chapter 1, have been designed to be purely 
competitive, allowing only for negative inputs from the partner, and in some games input 
from the partner is received only when losing (e.g., Atkins et al., 2001; Hubbard et al., 
2002; Muñoz et al., 2008; Phillips & Lochman, 2003; Waschbusch et al., 2002). Real 
social interactions involve an ongoing exchange of social signals and typically have an 
alternative outcome that is not competitive. These characteristics make children’s 
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potentially aggressive social interactions more like cooperative dilemmas than like 
competitions in which there can only be one winner. 
The RPD captures this characteristic of social interactions and allows for 
measurement of both negative (defection) and positive (cooperation) behaviors. The RPD 
can be construed as both a collaborative and competitive task, since outcomes depend on 
the joint decisions of the two play partners and incentives are set up such that exploitation 
of the partner leads to a maximum payoff for the round, but in the long run mutual 
cooperation can lead to more mutual gain. Also, throughout the game, the signal from the 
interaction partner is ongoing and can be either positive or negative. This context allowed 
us to create semi-controlled interactions that were likely to generate an aggressive 
(defection) response. 
In this study, we used a version of the RPD game (described in detail in Chapter 
2) created based on a visual interface that has been used successfully with children (Blake 
et al., 2015). Children played ten rounds of the game with three different partners who 
they believed were other children. However, the partners were pre-programmed to create 
combinations of play that were meant to provoke and in some cases appease. All children 
first played a purely-reactive TFT partner to determine their baseline rate of cooperation. 
Recall that this strategy cooperates in the first round and then mirrors the child’s move in 
the prior round. Given this strategy, defection will only occur if the child defects first. 
Next children played an 80% cooperating (80C) and an 80% defecting (80D) partner, 
order counterbalanced between subjects. These partners followed a fixed pattern of play, 
changing from C or D in the 3rd and 7th rounds to capture children’s reactions. In 
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addition, we measured children’s reactive and proactive aggression through parent report 
on a standard aggression measure (PRPA, Kempes et al., 2006). We were unable to 
obtain parent report of aggression for some children, and some answers on the reports 
were incomplete. Complete data was obtained for 153 children for reactive aggression 
and 158 children for proactive aggression, and for 152 children for both reactive and 
proactive aggression. Children with missing proactive or reactive scores were excluded 
from analyses involving those scores. As described in Chapter 2, we used a median split 
to create high reactive (N = 58) and low reactive (N = 95), and high proactive (N = 33) 
and low proactive (N = 125) groups respectively. 
Previous research has shown that children with high reactive aggression tend to 
interpret ambiguous social interactions, such as someone bumping into you, as hostile in 
nature (Dodge & Coie, 1987; Fontaine & Dodge, 2006). Reactive children also tend to 
“hold a grudge” longer than children without aggressive tendencies (Waschbusch et al., 
2002). These differences from control groups suggest that the negative interpretation of 
social behavior and the failure to forgive negative actions may be the drivers of 
aggressive behaviors in reactive aggressive children. We thus hypothesized that: 
a) high reactive aggressive children would react more strongly to defection in the 
RPD, demonstrated by lower cooperation immediately following partner defection, as 
compared to children low in reactive aggression, 
b) high reactive aggressive children would be less forgiving of partner defection, 
demonstrated by a longer string of defections in the rounds following partner defection, 
compared to children low in reactive aggression, 
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c) the predicted, unforgiving response for (b) is a characteristic of the GRIM 
strategy described in Chapter 3; thus, we also assessed whether high reactive children 
were more likely to use this strategy in a separate strategy analysis. 
Proactive aggression has been characterized by calculated, instrumental behavior 
(Crick & Dodge, 1996). As such, high proactive aggressive children would more likely 
be motivated by payoff. We hypothesized that they would try to obtain points in the RPD 
game through exploitative aggressive strategies: 
a) high proactive aggressive children would seek an advantage by defecting more 
in response to partner cooperation, compared to low proactive children; this move would 
be an attempt to create a DC outcome with highest payout to the child, 
b) high proactive aggressive children would defect more in the last round, 
c) high proactive aggressive children would cooperate more after mutual 
defection; this move would be an attempt to return to a combination of decisions (CC) 
that would yield a higher payout to the child, 
d) high proactive aggressive children would be more likely to use a WSLS 
strategy, which is a more exploitative, gain-focused and less impulsive strategy, 
compared to low proactive children. 
Note that the prediction for (c) differs from (a) but is in agreement with (b) in how 
children would respond to mutual cooperation (CC). If children actively seek to exploit 
the partner, they would defect after CC, but a WSLS strategy would cooperate since the 
child earns a high amount of points. Also, WSLS strategy is consistent with (b) and 
would cooperate after mutual defection, since DD produces a “losing” payout. Because 
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nothing is known about how proactively aggressive children might approach the game, 
we tested both possibilities in different analyses. 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
We analyzed the relation between aggression profiles (low or high reactive or 
proactive aggression groups) and RPD game play using a series of nested logistic 
regression models. We used logistic models because the RPD produces a binary decision 
in each round: cooperate (coded as 1) or defect (coded as 0). Each child played thirty 
rounds in total, which were treated as a repeated measure with rounds nested under each 
participant. The slopes and intercepts were allowed to vary for each participant with 
clustering of standard errors. Unlike studies that paired participants randomly with each 
other, we standardized the experience of all of our participants by having them play with 
pre-programmed algorithms. Since their strategies were part of the experimental design, 
we introduced the partner as a categorical predictor in some of the relevant logistic 
models.  
The analyses followed a standard approach for RPDs (Blake et al., 2015; 
Fudenberg et al., 2012). We first tested overall cooperation across all rounds and across 
partners comparing the high and low aggression groups for the reactive and proactive 
measures. We then systematically analyzed decisions in particular circumstances to better 
understand the behavioral patterns associated with each profile:  
a) following partner decision in the previous round (C or D)  
b) following different child-partner decision combinations (CC, CD, DC, DD) 
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c) and in the round-by-round responses to the 80C and 80D partners 
Finally we tested whether children’s strategies in the game matched some of the 
standard game theoretic strategies for the RPD (TFT, WSLS and GRIM) and whether the 
match predicted children’s aggression profiles. We calculated the match to these 
strategies in the same way as explained in Chapter 3.  
 
Results 
RPD decisions and aggression profiles 
We first examined the effect of testing location (online vs. schools) on decisions 
in the RPD game. We also checked whether location predicted belonging to the low or 
high reactive and proactive aggression groups. No differences were found and thus data 
was combined for further analyses.  
To determine whether reactive or proactive aggression (low or high) predicted the 
probability of cooperation in the RPD, we created a nested logistic regression model with 
RPD decisions from 30 rounds, nested under each participant, as the dependent variable 
(coded 1 for C and 0 for D). Age (in years) and gender were introduced as covariates (see 
Table 7). Older children cooperated more (Β = 0.312, p = 0.002) and children in the high 
reactive aggression group cooperated significantly less (see Figure 6a) than children in 
the low reactive aggression group (Β = -0.447, p = 0.022). There were no differences 
between children in the low and high proactive aggression groups in terms of 
cooperation. Gender did not significantly predict cooperation either. 
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Table 7. Probability of cooperation by low and high reactive and proactive aggressive 
children 
            
  Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept -3.606 
 
1.03*** 
  Age 0.312 
 
0.10** 0.11 0.51 
Gender 0.049 
 
0.17 -0.29 0.39 
Reactive Aggression (Low/High) -0.447 
 
0.19* -0.83 -0.06 
Proactive Aggression (Low/High) 0.205 
 
0.21 -0.20 0.61 
      
      Log Likelihood -2930.18 
    # Observations 4560 
    # Children/Clusters 152 
    χ2(df) 15.07(4) 
    Pseudo R2 0.02         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
      
Contingent Cooperation 
The RPD is an interactive task, and decisions are often made in response to the partner. 
Following prior RPD studies, we next investigated how children reacted to the partner’s 
decisions in the previous round (see Table 8). We first confirmed that all children 
engaged in contingent play: they cooperated more following partner cooperation than 
following partner defection (Β = 1.257, p < 0.001). Older children cooperated more 
following partner cooperation than younger ones (Β = 0.467, p < 0.001). Consistent with 
prior RPDs with children, participants in this sample did not play the RPD randomly but 
were responding to partner decisions (see Figure 6b). 
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Figure 6. Overall cooperation and contingent cooperation in the RPD for children in the 
low and high reactive aggression groups 
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Table 8. Probability of cooperating after partner C and partner D for low and high 
reactive and proactive aggressive children 
  Β   SE 95% CI   Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept -4.522  1.342**    -1.622  1.075   
Age 0.454  0.131** 0.20 0.71  0.035  0.109 -0.18 0.25 
Gender 0.050  0.220 -0.38 0.48  0.072  0.177 -0.27 0.42 
Reactive  -0.457  0.233† -0.91 0.00  -0.563  0.196** -0.95 -0.18 
Proactive  0.042  0.276 -0.50 0.58  0.473  0.195* 0.09 0.86 
(Low/High)            
            
Log Likelihood -1393.29      -1020.47     
# Observations 2085      2019     
# Children/Clusters 152      152     
χ2(df) 16.37(4)      12.42(4)     
Pseudo R2 0.03           0.01         
† p=0.05 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001        
 
Comparing the high and low reactive aggression groups revealed that cooperation 
was lower for high reactive children both following partner cooperation, Β = -0.457, p = 
0.05, 95% CI [-0.91, 0.00], and following partner defection, Β = -0.563, p = 0.004, 95% 
CI [-0.95, -0.18]. Surprisingly, high proactive aggressive children were more likely to 
cooperate than low proactive aggressive ones following partner defection (Β = 0.473, p = 
0.015). There were no differences in cooperation between high and low proactive 
aggressive children following partner cooperation. 
The differences in contingent cooperation between the high and low aggression 
groups may have depended on the child’s decision in the prior round in addition to the 
partner’s decision, as has been found in prior work (Blake et al., 2015). To examine this 
possibility, we next analyzed the effect of the combined (child, partner) decisions in the 
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prior round on cooperation in the current round (see Table 9 and Figure 6c). Since each 
player has a binary choice between C and D, four decision combinations are possible: 
mutual cooperation (CC), child cooperation and partner defection (CD), child defection 
and partner cooperation (DC) and mutual defection (DD). 
Recall that mutual cooperation (CC) produces the highest total payoff for the dyad 
(3 points each) and thus represents a positive and successful interaction. Following 
mutual cooperation children tended to cooperate again. Holding proactive aggression 
constant, there were no differences between the low reactive and high reactive groups 
(low reactive: 58.12% C, high reactive: 57.58% C). Holding reactive aggression constant, 
there were no significant differences between high and low proactive aggression groups 
either (low proactive: 59.92% C, high proactive: 49.28% C). Older children tended to 
cooperate more after mutual cooperation (Β = 0.417, p = 0.019). 
By contrast, a CD interaction results in the lowest payoff for the child (0 points) 
and the highest for the partner (4 points). Following these cases of being exploited by the 
partner, all children tended to defect. There were no differences between reactive 
aggressive groups (low reactive: 19.88% C, high reactive: 14.98% C) or proactive 
aggressive groups (low proactive: 18.64% C, high proactive: 13.64% C). Thus, when the 
child cooperated in the prior round, decisions depended on what the partner did in the 
prior round but not on the level of aggression. Older children tended to cooperate more 
after being exploited by the partner (Β = 0.414, p = 0.024) and girls tended to cooperate 
less than boys (Β = -0.627, p = 0.031). 
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Table 9. Probability of cooperation after combined decisions in the previous round 
  CC         CD         
             Β   SE 95% CI Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept -3.219 
 
1.813 
  
-5.049 
 
1.899** 
  Age 0.417 
 
0.177* 0.07 0.76 0.414 
 
0.183* 0.05 0.77 
Gender -0.031 
 
0.281 -0.58 0.52 -0.627 
 
0.291* -1.20 -0.06 
Reactive Aggression -0.036 
 
0.306 -0.63 0.56 -0.130 
 
0.332 -0.78 0.52 
Proactive Aggression -0.291 
 
0.360 -0.10 0.41 -0.237 
 
0.437 -1.09 0.62 
(Low/High) 
          
           Log Likelihood -523.60 
    
-315.52 
    # Observations 896 
    
611 
    # Kids/Clusters 122 
    
134 
    χ2(df) 6.65(4) 
    
12.27(4) 
    Pseudo R2 0.02         0.04         
                      
 
DC 
    
DD 
    
             Β   SE 95% CI Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept -3.534 
 
1.490* 
  
0.521 
 
1.394 
  Age 0.287 
 
0.147 0.00 0.57 -0.208 
 
0.141 -0.48 0.07 
Gender 0.137 
 
0.251 -0.35 0.63 0.474 
 
0.216* 0.05 0.90 
Reactive Aggression -0.702 
 
0.260** -1.21 -0.19 -0.692 
 
0.230** -1.14 -0.24 
Proactive Aggression 0.096 
 
0.309 -0.51 0.70 0.762 
 
0.224** 0.32 1.20 
(Low/High) 
          
           Log Likelihood -706.29 
    
-677.63 
    # Observations 1189 
    
1408 
    # Children/Clusters 152 
    
152 
    χ2(df) 11.69(4) 
    
26.50(4) 
    Pseudo R2 0.03         0.04         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
        
Differences between reactive aggression groups emerged when the child had 
defected in the prior round. When the child exploited the partner (DC) in the prior round, 
children low in reactive aggression were more likely to cooperate (43.2% C) compared to 
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those high in reactive aggression (27.3 % C, Β = -0.702 p = 0.007), controlling for 
proactive aggression. Given that the children in these cases had just received the highest 
possible payoff (4 points), it is notable that the children low in reactive aggression 
seemed to shift towards re-establishing cooperation, while children high in reactive 
aggression continued to defect. There were no significant differences between children 
low in proactive aggression and children high in proactive aggression (low proactive: 
38.05% C, high proactive: 30.79% C) following DC rounds. It is surprising that children 
high in proactive aggression did not continue defecting after receiving the highest 
possible payoff of 4 points. 
For both reactive and proactive aggression a difference between low and high 
groups emerged after mutual defection (DD), but in the opposite direction. In a DD 
round, both children receive a low payoff of 1 point each. Children high in reactive 
aggression were less likely to cooperate on the next round compared to children low in 
reactive aggression (high reactive: 21.09% C, low reactive: 29.10% C, Β = -0.692 p = 
0.003), controlling for proactive aggression. On the contrary, children high in proactive 
aggression were significantly more likely to cooperate on the next round compared to 
children low in proactive aggression (high proactive: 30.46% C, low proactive: 24.52% 
C, Β = 0.762, p = 0.001), while keeping reactive aggression constant. This suggests that 
children high in proactive aggression might have understood that mutual defection can 
have a detrimental effect on the payoff, and were trying to restore partner cooperation. 
Girls were more likely to cooperate following mutual defection (Β = 0.474, p = 0.028). 
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Combined, these responses suggest that children with a low reactive aggression 
profile are more likely to return to cooperation after they defected. However, their return 
to cooperation after defection is modulated by the partner’s decision, because low 
reactive aggressive children but not high reactive aggressive children cooperate more 
after DC than after DD (Β = 0.623, p < 0.001). Also, high proactive aggressive children 
are more likely to re-establish cooperation but only after mutual defection (DD). 
In summary, these results replicate and extend prior work linking children’s 
aggression to contingent play in the RPD. One prior study found that children rated high 
on conduct problems using a general scale of externalizing behavior cooperated less after 
the they had defected in the prior round (Blake et al., 2015). We find similar results for 
children rated high on reactive aggression compared to low reactive aggression but find 
no differences in RPD play based on proactive aggression profile. However, given that 
the current experiment used pre-defined partner strategies, as opposed to live play with a 
peer, we can additionally examine how children with different aggression profiles 
respond to each of the three partners and compare responses to particular rounds of play 
designed to provoke an aggressive response. 
 
Cooperation with different partners and aggression profiles 
We first tested children’s cooperation on the first round of play with each partner. 
Cooperation on the first round did not differ between high and low reactive and proactive 
aggression groups for none of the three partners (TFT, 80C and 80D).  Also, the order of 
the 80C and 80D partners (which was counterbalanced) did not significantly predict 
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cooperation in the first round of play with these partners. Thus, children approached each 
partner as distinct and their experience with a mostly cooperating or defecting partner did 
not spill over into the initial interaction with the new partner. 
Each child first played with a TFT partner that cooperated on the first round and 
then mirrored the child’s decision on the prior round. The TFT partner offers insight into 
children’s baseline approach to the task. In particular, given that the TFT partner starts 
with cooperation and will continue to cooperate if the child does so on the first round, the 
child must be the first to defect. We first examined whether children defected at all with 
this partner, and found that 81.1% of children defected at least once during play with the 
TFT partner and 44.0% of the children defected in the first round. There were no overall 
differences in cooperation level between high and low reactive or high and low proactive 
groups. 
The next two partners, 80C and 80D, were designed to elicit responses to 
particular patterns of play that were meant to provoke or appease. Both partners followed 
a fixed pattern of play: 80C always defects on rounds 3 and 7 and cooperates otherwise, 
and 80D always cooperates on rounds 3 and 7 and defects otherwise. The order of these 
two partners was counterbalanced and no order effects were found. With the 80C partner 
children high in reactive aggression cooperated less than children low in reactive 
aggression (Β = -0.571, p = 0.009). There were no differences between high and low 
proactive aggressive groups in the level of cooperation with 80C. With the 80D partner, 
again children high in reactive aggression cooperated less than children low in reactive 
aggression (Β = -0.591, p = 0.006). There were again no differences between high and 
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low proactive aggressive groups in cooperation with 80D. Because we found no 
differences between the high and low proactive aggression groups, the follow-up analyses 
presented below refer only to reactive aggression. 
 
Reactive aggression and responses to fixed strategy partners 
We next examined play patterns with each of the 80C and 80D partners in order 
to test how children with low and high reactive aggression responded after the partner 
deviated from the overall pattern of cooperating or defecting (i.e.,, after round 3 and 7; 
see Figure 7). We analyzed decisions over the course of the interaction with the partner 
by grouping rounds into three logical periods (see Table 9). The first three rounds 
represented a baseline during which children adjusted their cooperation to each particular 
partner (following Muñoz et al., 2008). Given that the 80C and 80D partners deviated 
from their general pattern of cooperation and defection in rounds 3 and 7, rounds 4 and 8 
represented the child’s response to that change. For the 80C partner in particular, we 
predicted that children high in reactive aggression would be more likely to defect in the 
response rounds, showing a hostile attribution bias to the partner’s defection. The rounds 
following the response rounds (5,6,7,9,10) represented recovery periods during which 
children re-adapt to the partner. This grouping of rounds follows prior work that found a 
faster “dissipation” of anger in control groups compared to reactive children 
(Waschbusch et al, 2002; Helseth et al., 2015). For each grouping, we combined 
children’s decisions (treating decisions as repeated measures by nesting rounds under 
each participant) and compared the high and low reactive aggression groups. 
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The 80C partner 
As mentioned above, with the 80C partner overall, children in the low reactive 
aggression group were more likely to cooperate than children in the high reactive group, 
unlike when playing against the TFT partner. However, the degree of cooperation varied 
systematically over rounds in response to the partner’s decisions. For the baseline rounds, 
there was no difference between low reactive and high reactive aggression children in the 
probability of cooperation in these rounds. In the response rounds, there were again no 
differences between the high and low reactive aggression groups, suggesting that both 
groups of children responded to defection with defection. In the recovery rounds, children 
in the low reactive aggression group were significantly more likely to return to 
cooperation than children in the high reactive aggression group (Β = -0.711, p = 0.004). 
This was also true when rounds 5 and 9 were taken alone  
(Β = -0.714, p = 0.016). Combined these results suggest that both high and low reactive 
children behave similarly in their initial interactions with a generally cooperative partner 
and both punish the partner’s defection. However, high and low reactive aggression 
children differ in how they recover from the partner’s defection, with low reactive 
aggressive children more likely to re-establish cooperation. 
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Figure 7. Cooperation for low and high reactive aggression groups by round with 80C 
and 80D partners 
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Table 10. Regression models for cooperation for low and high reactive aggression groups 
with 80C and 80D partners 
                  
80C Round 1 Rounds 2, 3 Rounds 4, 8 Rounds 5-7, 9-10 
           B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept -3.886 2.076 -3.093 1.809 -2.233 1.956 -4.603 1.572** 
Age 0.387 0.204 0.329 0.178 0.119 0.188 0.437 0.152** 
Gender 0.068 0.331 -0.204 0.297 0.045 0.293 0.204 0.242 
Aggression -0.188 0.341 -0.438 0.308 -0.113 0.311 -0.711 0.245** 
(Low/High) 
        
         Log Likelihood -103.84 
 
-206.91 
 
-174.35 
 
-492.73 
 # Observations 153 
 
306 
 
306 
 
765 
 # Children/Clusters 153 
 
153 
 
153 
 
153 
 χ2(df) 4.24(3) 
 
6.14 
 
0.75 
 
17.43 
 Pseudo R2 0.02   0.02   0.002   0.05   
         80D Round 1 Rounds 2, 3 Rounds 4, 8 Rounds 5-7, 9-10 
           B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept -4.744 2.134* -1.823 1.712 -4.981 1.621** -1.537 1.504 
Age 0.524 0.209* 0.033 0.172 0.428 0.158** 0.034 0.148 
Gender -0.242 0.341 0.311 0.292 -0.121 0.294 -0.108 0.243 
Aggression -0.631 0.348 -0.206 0.308 -0.584 0.316 -0.680 0.272* 
(Low/High) 
        
         Log Likelihood -100.04 
 
-150.52 
 
-176.15 
 
-362.67 
 # Observations 153 
 
306 
 
306 
 
765 
 # Children/Clusters 153 
 
153 
 
153 
 
153 
 χ2(df) 10.78 
 
2.13 
 
10.71 
 
6.67(3) 
 Pseudo R2 0.05   0.01   0.03   0.01   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The 80D partner 
For the 80D partner we again grouped the rounds into baseline, response and 
recovery and compared the cooperation probabilities for the reactive aggression profiles. 
Baseline rounds 2 and 3 represent a reaction to two consecutive defections on the part of 
the partner. We found no difference between the low and high reactive aggression groups 
in the probability with which they engaged in cooperation in these rounds (see Table 10). 
Rounds 4 and 8 represent a response to partner cooperation in rounds 3 and 7, and 
measure the immediate reaction to “an olive branch” extended by a partner who 
established itself as generally non-cooperative. There were again no differences between 
low and high reactive aggression children in terms of the probability of cooperating on 
these rounds. Finally, rounds 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 represent the extended reaction to a mostly 
non-cooperative partner that does sometimes cooperate albeit rarely. Low reactive 
aggressive children were significantly more likely to cooperate in these rounds than high 
reactive aggressive children (Β = -0.680, p = 0.012). This suggests that low reactive 
aggressive children are more likely to seek cooperation even with a generally non-
cooperative partner compared to high reactive aggressive children.  
 
Transitions between periods for 80C and 80D 
A second analysis focused on the transitions between the baseline, response and 
recovery periods for both the 80C and 80D partner. Children with different aggression 
profiles may have different responses to the partner’s decisions in rounds 3 and 7 given 
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that these are the first and second deviations from the partner’s general pattern of 
cooperating and defecting. We examined these rounds separately (see Table 11).  
 
Table 11. Cooperation with partner before and after partner defection for reactive 
aggression profiles 
80C Low Reactive Aggression   High Reactive Aggression 
 
n=95, obs.=190 
 
n=58, obs.=116 
                    
  B SE 95% CI   B SE 95% CI 
Round 3 to 4 -1.180 0.33*** -1.83 -0.53 
 
-0.785 0.42 -1.61 0.04 
Round 4 to 5 0.798 0.31* 0.18 1.41 
 
0.463 0.36 -0.24 1.16 
Round 7 to 8 -1.048 0.33** -1.69 -0.40 
 
-0.259 0.40 -1.04 0.52 
Round 8 to 9 0.872 0.3** 0.29 1.46   -0.099 0.45 -0.99 -0.79 
          80D 
                             
Round 3 to 4 0.905 0.35* 0.21 1.60 
 
0.864 0.48 -0.08 1.81 
Round 4 to 5 -0.472 0.35 -1.15 0.21 
 
-0.591 0.49 -1.54 0.36 
Round 7 to 8 0.203 0.26 -0.31 0.71 
 
0.425 0.47 -0.50 1.35 
Round 8 to 9 -0.553 0.34 -1.22 0.11   -0.130 0.51 -1.12 0.86 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
       
 
When playing the 80C partner, low reactive aggressive children showed a 
significant drop in cooperation in response to partner’s defection both in round 4 (Round 
3: 53.68% C vs. Round 4: 26.31% C, Β  = -1.180, p < 0.001) and in round 8 (Round 7: 
47.36% C, Β = -1.048, p = 0.002 vs. Round 8: 27.36% C) as compared to rounds 3 and 7, 
respectively. However, there was a subsequent significant increase in cooperation in 
rounds 5 and 9 as compared to 4 and 8 respectively (Round 5: 44.21% C, Β = 0.798, p < 
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0.001; Round 9: 47.36% C, Β = 0.872, p = 0.003), suggesting that low reactive aggressive 
children promptly recovered and returned to cooperation. In contrast, high reactive 
aggressive children never recovered after the first partner defection. They showed 
decreased cooperation in round 4 in response to partner defection (Round 3: 37.93% C 
vs. Round 4: 22.41% C, Β = -0.785, p = 0.06, 95% CI [-1.61, 0.04]), but no subsequent 
significant increase in cooperation in round 5 (Round 5: 31.03% C). Further, there were  
no significant differences in cooperation between rounds 7 and 8, and 8 and 9 for high 
reactive aggressive children. Thus, high reactive children appeared to follow a GRIM 
strategy of defecting in response to the partner’s first defection and continuing to defect 
thereafter. 
When playing the 80D partner, children Low in Reactive Aggression showed a 
significant increase in cooperation in round 4 (Round 3: 12.06% C vs. Round 4: 24.13% 
C, Β = 0.905, p = 0.01), in response to partner’s first cooperative move but no subsequent 
changes in cooperation when transitioning between the response and recovery rounds. 
There were no significant differences in cooperation between transition rounds for the 
high reactive aggressive children. 
 
Last round defection 
A common strategy in the RPD is to defect on the last round (Andreoni, & Miller, 
1993; Normann & Wallace, 2012), since the partner will not have a chance to retaliate. 
To explore whether children engaged in so-called “backwards induction” and switched 
from cooperation to defection in the last round, we compared cooperation on the last 
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round with cooperation on the second-to-last round. We found no significant differences 
in cooperation on the last round as compared to the second-to-last round for all children 
combined (Β = 0.085, p = 0.394). This was also the case when we analyzed data 
separately from the high proactive (Β = -0.152, p = 0.585) and high reactive aggression 
groups (Β = -0.135, p = 0.532). 
 
Aggression and the standard game theoretic strategies 
We used the same method described in Chapter 3 to calculate how closely 
children’s patterns of play matched standard strategies from game theory: TFT, WSLS 
and GRIM. We then investigated whether the extent to which children’s pattern of play 
across all partners matched the standard PD strategies was related to their aggression 
profiles. TFT is a cooperative and reciprocal strategy, in which one starts by cooperating 
and then responding in kind to the partner. WSLS is a strategy focused on winning and 
unlike TFT it allows continued defection after exploiting the partner (DC). GRIM is an 
unforgiving strategy, which does not restore cooperation after partner’s first defection.  
We used a nested logistic model to predict belonging to the high or low reactive 
profiles (coded 1 for high, 0 for low). The independent variable was the match to each of 
the classical strategies (coded 1 for match, 0 for non-match) for each round across the 
three partners. Each round was considered a repeated measure and nested under each 
participant. Closer match to the GRIM strategy significantly predicted a higher chance of 
belonging to the high reactive aggressive group (Β = 0.425, p < 0.001; see Table 12). No 
other strategy match significantly predicted group membership for reactive aggression. A 
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similar logistic model was used to investigate the relation between proactive aggression 
profiles and strategy matches, but none of the strategies significantly predicted proactive 
aggression across all partners. 
 
Table 12. Aggression profiles and standard RPD strategies 
  Reactive Aggression Proactive Aggression 
  (0 - Low, 1 - High) (0 - Low , 1 - High) 
                      
  Β   SE 95% CI Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept 2.734 
 
2.089 
  
1.028 
 
2.381 
  Age -0.307 
 
0.208 -0.71 0.09 -0.241 
 
0.237 -0.71 0.22 
Gender -0.452 
 
0.34 -1.12 0.21 0.097 
 
0.396 -0.68 0.87 
TFT -0.242 
 
0.136 -0.51 0.02 -0.155 
 
0.158 -0.46 0.15 
WSLS -0.157 
 
0.115 -0.38 0.07 0.106 
 
0.126 -0.14 0.35 
GRIM 0.425 
 
0.111*** 0.21 0.64 0.041 
 
0.126 -0.21 0.29 
           Log Likelihood -2963.5 
    
-2408.033 
    # Observations 4590 
    
4740 
    # Kids/Clusters 153 
    
158 
    χ2(df) 18.69(5) 
    
7.15(5) 
    Pseudo R2 0.03         0.01         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
        
Since children modulated their responses based on the partner they played, we 
tested whether the patterns of play with specific partners and their match to the classical 
PD strategies predicted children’s aggression profiles. Closer match to the GRIM strategy 
predicted a higher probability of belonging to the high reactive aggressive group when 
playing against TFT (Β = 0.447, p = 0.009), 80C (Β = 0.271, p = 0.018) and 80D (Β = 
0.505, p = 0.011). Closer match to the TFT strategy predicted a lower probability of 
belonging to the high proactive aggression group when playing TFT (Β = -0.385, p = 
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0.049) and a lower probability of belonging to the high reactive aggression group when 
playing against 80C (Β = -0.428, p = 0.014). Lastly, closer match to the WSLS strategy 
predicted a higher probability of belonging to the high proactive aggressive group when 
playing the TFT partner (Β = 0.409, p = 0.053) and a lower probability of belonging to 
the high reactive aggressive group (Β = -0.360, p = 0.025).  
 
Discussion 
This study demonstrates that the RPD can be fruitfully used to study key aspects 
of both reactive and proactive aggression in children. The task allows for systematic 
investigations of interaction patterns that distinguish children with high and low, reactive 
and proactive types of aggression. We found clear signatures of reactive aggression in 
RPD play: decreased overall cooperation and lack of forgiveness for partner defection. 
Also, we found tentative indications that proactive aggression might also be related to 
more subtle differences in RPD strategy. 
Our results partially supported our first hypothesis: that children high in reactive 
aggression would react more to partner defection. Both low and high reactive aggressive 
children defected in response to partner defection. While there were no differences in the 
likelihood of defection between the two groups after being exploited by the partner (child 
C and partner D in previous round), children high in reactive aggression cooperated less 
than low reactive aggressive children after mutual defection (DD in previous round). This 
result is consistent with findings that all children react to high provocation in games, but 
only reactive aggressive children react to low provocation (Muñoz et al., 2008). The CD 
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rounds, in which the interaction results in the highest payoff for the partner and no payoff 
for the child, can be considered a high provocation outcome compared to the DD rounds, 
in which the interaction results in a low payoff for both the child and the partner. 
Our second hypothesis that high reactive aggressive children would be less 
forgiving of partner defection was confirmed. Following partner defection, low reactive 
aggressive children were willing to forgive the partner and attempt to re-establish 
cooperation, giving them the benefit of the doubt. By contrast, children with high reactive 
aggression began their interaction with each partner at a typical level of cooperation but 
quickly defected in response to the partner’s defection and continued to defect thereafter. 
Notably, with the 80C partner the high reactive aggressive group did not cooperate even 
after multiple cooperative moves by the partner. This pattern resembles the GRIM 
strategy from game theory, defined as C until partner D, then D. Closer adherence to a 
GRIM strategy predicted membership in the high reactive aggression group both when 
the rounds were all combined and when they were examined for each of the partners. 
This result confirms our third hypothesis for reactive aggression. 
These results are similar to findings by Waschbush et al. (2002) who investigated 
the dissipation of anger in a competitive reaction time task. The rules of the game were 
that each time one of the players lost, the winner could punish the loser by taking away 
points from them, without being able to keep them for oneself. The game was rigged such 
that the child lost to the partner, who punished at high levels by taking away a lot of 
points. The child won for the next four rounds. Waschbush et al. measured the amount of 
points children took from the partner in the four trials after the partner took a lot from 
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them. For these “anger dissipation trials,” they found that children with a co-morbid 
diagnosis of ADHD and ODD/CD, a diagnostic profile more typical of reactive 
aggression (Kempes et al., 2005), continued to punish at high levels. Unlike the control 
group, they did not decrease point taking over the four trials following high provocation. 
Although our findings are consistent with those of Waschbush et al. (2002), 
several differences in the tasks warrant further discussion. Unlike the competitive task 
used by Waschbush et al., in which there is only one winner per round, mutual 
cooperation in the RPD can result in a high, equal payoff for both partners, a positive and 
thus desirable interaction. In addition, in the competitive task the child receives an 
unambiguous negative message from the partner in rounds in which the partner wins, but 
no signal from the partner when the child wins. Thus, during the “anger dissipation” trials 
the partner cannot signal a willingness to return to better behavior. Taking away points 
from the partner during these “anger dissipation” trials is thus solely attributed to anger 
and amounts to punishment of the partner.  In the RPD however, the signal from the 
partner is ongoing. Thus, when the child continues to defect while the partner cooperates, 
as occurs with the 80C partner, their aggressive response is resistant to overtures to re-
establish cooperation from the partner. 
This difference in the RPD compared to competitive tasks demonstrates the 
persistence of a negative response in a somewhat more realistic context, given that they 
can see the partner’s responses each round. However, the specific motives that lead to the 
GRIM strategy remain unclear. One possibility is that children lose trust in the partner 
and choose to defect out of fear of being exploited again. This explanation gains some 
		 85	
support from one study using a Trust Game in which children with conduct problems 
were both less trustworthy and less trusting (Sharp et al., 2011). A second possibility is 
that children are actively trying to exploit the partner when they defect. In this case, 
children may initially defect out of anger, but when they receive a high payout for doing 
so, given that the partner cooperated, they may continue to seek this advantage. While 
this kind of exploitative motive is more characteristic of proactive than reactive 
aggression, it represents a plausible alternative. Although the current study cannot 
distinguish between these motives, simply asking children what they expect the partner to 
do before each round would provide an answer. If they defect when they expect the 
partner to defect, they lack trust in the partner. By contrast, if they defect when they 
expect the partner to cooperate, they are trying to take advantage of the partner. 
A third possible explanation for the GRIM strategy is that trust and anger work 
together to generate a response. Reactive aggression is often associated with a history of 
abuse (Vitaro et al., 2006). It is possible that exposure to chronic threat can cause a lack 
of trust, and that initially natural defensive responses over time take the form of 
exaggerated displays of anger and punishment. Future experiments could disentangle the 
two motives by comparing the reaction to partner defection of high reactive aggressive 
children when the partner has the reputation of being a high-cooperator and thus of being 
trustworthy (the child could be told that this partner has cooperated a lot in the past with 
other children) compared to a partner with a reputation of being a high-defector. 
For proactive aggression, our first two hypotheses concerned advantage seeking 
behaviors: defecting in response to partner cooperation and defecting in the last round of 
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the game. High proactive aggressive children did not defect more after partner 
cooperation. This may have been due to the fact that they viewed a mutual cooperation 
interaction (CC), where they each got 3 points, as a successful outcome. In addition, they 
may have considered the one extra point that they would receive by exploiting the partner 
(CD round) not worth the risk of the partner retaliating. Since proactive aggressive 
children are typically motivated by instrumental goals (Crick & Dodge, 1996), future 
experiments could test their propensity to resort to exploitation for material gain by 
changing the payoff matrix of the RPD and making exploitation more appealing. This 
would probably increase defection rates for all children, but proactive aggressive children 
should seek this option more often if their goal is to exploit the partner. 
We also found no support for the hypothesis that high proactive aggressive 
children would more likely switch to defection on the last round. Although we drew 
attention to the last round in the games by clearly announcing it through a written 
message that appeared at the top of the screen, children might have not understood its 
significance – that there can be no retaliation from the partner following it. Blake et al. 
(2015) also failed to find any decrease in cooperation in the last round, a phenomenon 
that often appears in games with adults (Andreoni & Miller, 1993). It is possible that 
children simply do not reason about the game at the same level of detail and maturity, 
and that children’s abilities to engage in backward induction are limited. However, this 
does not preclude the possibility that proactive aggressive children might have engaged in 
more exploitative last-round defection had they been made aware of its characteristics. 
Future experiments could in principle elucidate this. 
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We did find support for our third hypothesis: children high in proactive 
aggression were more likely to cooperate after mutual defection than children low in 
proactive aggression, which can be interpreted as seeking to restore cooperation and 
return to a higher paying decision combination, CC or DC. This is consistent with the 
idea that proactive aggressive children are motivated by payoff in interactions. This 
pattern of play of high proactive aggressive children resembles the WSLS strategy. A 
characteristic feature of the WSLS strategy is that one shifts to C when faced with mutual 
defection, because DD is considered a losing payout. 
Indeed, our last hypothesis for proactive aggression concerned the use of a 
particular, instrumental strategy: WSLS.  We did find tentative support for this 
prediction. When playing the TFT partner, high proactive aggressive children were more 
likely to follow the WSLS strategy and were less likely to use a TFT strategy. There are 
two key differences between the two strategies. One is in how the player responds to DC, 
the case in which the child defects and the partner cooperates leading to 4 points for the 
child and none for the partner. The WSLS strategy considers this outcome a “win” and 
thus “stays” with their current move and defects again. By contrast, the TFT strategy sees 
that the partner has cooperated and cooperates in response. Another difference is in how 
the player responds to DD, the case in which both partners defect on each other, leading 
to 1 point for each of the partners. The WSLS strategy considers this outcome a “loss” 
and thus “shifts” their move to cooperation. By contrast, the TFT strategy sees that the 
partner has defected and defects in response. Thus, the WSLS strategy will continue to 
exploit the partner after successfully exploiting them but will also return to cooperation if 
		 88	
response to a low mutual defection payout.  Intriguingly, WSLS only appeared for the 
high proactive aggression children when playing the TFT partner. Recall that for this 
partner, the child must be the first to defect. By extension it seems that this group of 
children are likely initiating defect and then trying to exploit the partner again, but will 
return to cooperation if mutual defection ensues.  This stands in contrast to the GRIM 
strategy used by the high reactive aggression children, which is purely reacting to the 
partner’s defection and never returns to cooperation. 
The findings regarding proactive aggression must be interpreted with caution for 
several reasons. The sample tested in this study was a community sample and therefore 
sub-clinical. Proactive aggression appears more rarely than reactive aggression in the 
general population, and this was the case for our sample as well. The children in our 
sample generally scored very low on proactive aggression, with a maximum score of 6 
out of the measure’s maximum possible of 12, while 78 children out of the total 158 
children for which proactive aggression scores were available had a score of zero. It is 
possible that our predictions for proactive aggression would appear in a clinical 
population. Also, interaction patterns might change with age and not continue into 
adolescence, although findings by Muñoz et al. (2008) who studied adolescents (ages 13-
18) similarly show that reactive aggressive children are more responsive to low 
provocation. It is still possible however that the specific motives of the behavioral 
response are different in adolescents. 
Finally, one hopeful take-away from this study is that aggressive behavior 
depends on the dyad. No matter what their levels of parent-rated aggression, children 
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began each interaction with a new partner at a similar level of cooperation and the order 
of the 80C and 80D partners did not matter. That is, no matter what children had 
experienced with a prior partner, they reset their expectations to begin interacting with 
the new partner. This is a somewhat surprising finding because one might predict that 
children high in reactive aggression would show anger or distrust towards everyone after 
one bad interaction. Instead both high proactive aggressive and high reactive aggressive 
start fresh with the new partner and modulate their play patterns based on the new 
interactions.  
In summary, the current study makes the following key contributions. First, it 
validates the RPD as a rigorous, safe and child-friendly measure of behaviors in negative 
interactions. Combined, results from this study also suggest that high reactive aggressive 
children a) have a more prolonged reaction to partner defection b) fail to return to 
cooperation and engage in GRIM play even when the partner repeatedly attempts to 
restore cooperative interactions. The RPD shows promise as an experimental tool for 
further studying the motivations, self-protective or punitive, that produce this failure to 
restore cooperation. Finally, this study shows that aggressive behavior, reactive and 
proactive, is interaction dependent: children modulate their responses based on partner 
strategy and interaction characteristics and give new partners the benefit of the doubt. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: EXTENDING THE SIP MODEL TO POSITIVE 
INTERACTIONS 
 
The SIP model has been primarily used for studying the cognitive steps involved 
in negative social interactions. The model however was proposed as a general theoretical 
framework meant to explain all types of interactions, including positive ones. This 
chapter presents findings on how the model applies to positive as well as negative social 
interactions. We then examine whether the responses to the SIP steps predicted behavior 
in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD). 
According to the SIP model, how children think about particular social 
interactions drives the formulation of behavioral responses in a situation. Both the 
external stimulus (e.g., the provocation) and the response (e.g., the aggressive reaction) 
are represented in the mind with meaning (Dodge, 2008). The external stimulus acquires 
meaning through the intent that is attributed to the interaction partner: was their action 
accidental or on purpose, and in the case of negative outcome situations was their 
intention hostile or benign? Meaning is also conferred to the response by evaluating it in 
relation to, for example, feasibility or self-efficacy (am I able to carry it out?), desired 
consequences (will it be good for me, will it accomplish my goals?) and moral or social 
acceptability (is it socially and morally OK to behave like this?).  
In order to evaluate the separate steps of this process of meaning making, SIP 
researchers typically present children with hypothetical vignettes and ask them to 
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imagine themselves in that situation. The vignettes describe a social interaction which 
results in either a positive or negative outcome but was caused by another person. For 
example, a child drops her homework on the way to school and another child steps on it 
in the mud. Given only this information, the action of the person who stepped on the 
homework is ambiguous – it may have been an accident or intentional. Children are then 
asked a series of questions to assess five steps in the SIP model (Crick & Dodge, 1994): 
1) encoding situational cues (details about what happened), 2) attributing intent (whether 
the other person did it on purpose or not), 3) selecting goals (maintaining a friendly 
relationship or retaliation), 4) generating possible behavioral responses (socially 
competent or aggressive responses), 5) evaluating these responses (in terms of self-
efficacy, consequences and moral acceptability) and selecting one to be enacted. 
Most studies have focused on negative scenarios; the results repeatedly show 
correlations between the steps of the model and aggressive behavior. For example, both 
hostile intent attribution and positive evaluation of aggression have been connected to 
chronic aggressive behavior in real life (Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Crick & Dodge, 1996; 
Dodge & Coie, 1987). A few studies have also linked prosocial behavior to socially 
competent responses on negative scenarios (Laible, McGinley, Carlo, Augustine, & 
Murphy, 2014; Laible, Murphy, & Augustine, 2014; Nelson & Crick, 1999).  For 
example, Nelson and Crick (1999) found that prosocial 10 to 12 year-olds, identified as 
prosocial in peer nominations, were less likely to attribute hostile intent in provocation 
situations, were more likely to evaluate aggressive responses negatively and prosocial 
responses positively, and were more likely to adopt relational as opposed to instrumental 
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goals. In one rare study using positive outcome vignettes, Andrade et al. (2012) found 
that children with ADHD had impairments in processing social information for all the 
steps of the model. However, they have not drawn any connections between positive 
intent attribution and positive responses in the measure. 
Given the dearth of studies using positive SIP vignettes, it remains unclear 
whether prosocial behaviors in positive interactions are formulated through the SIP steps. 
It is possible that children process positive interactions differently than negative ones. A 
new, large scale study of children’s reciprocity finds that children are highly attuned to 
negative outcomes inflicted by another child and target the malefactor with punishment. 
By contrast, children seem to expect positive outcomes from others and do not strictly 
reciprocate positive interactions (Chernyak, Hu, Dunham & Blake, in prep). Children are 
also highly attuned to intentions, which affects their willingness to reciprocate with 
partners.  This is evident in behavioral tasks with toddlers (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010) 
as well as in economic games with elementary school children (Sutter, 2007). 
In the current study, we assessed children’s SIP responses to both positive and 
negative vignettes. The positive vignettes were novel and negative vignettes were adapted 
from standard SIP tasks. The negative vignettes thus provided an anchor for validating 
children’s responses, which could then be compared to the positive vignettes. We then 
explored possible links between SIP cognitions and strategies of play in the RPD game. 
Given that SIP studies rarely link children’s thoughts to real behavioral measures, this 
last analysis was particularly valuable. 
We had three main hypotheses which drove the analyses: 
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a) both the negative and positive outcome vignettes would generate responses 
consistent with the general SIP theory 
b) hostile negative attribution would predict reactive aggression and positive 
evaluation of aggressive responses would predict proactive aggression 
c) SIP responses would predict different levels of cooperation in the RPD. 
Given that the relationship between the SIP and RPD has never been studied, we 
conducted several exploratory analyses. We first evaluated whether children processing 
social information more negatively (making more hostile attributions, generating more 
aggressive responses, and evaluating aggression more positively), as reflected by their 
total negative-vignettes score, are less likely to cooperate in the RPD. Conversely, we 
also tested whether children processing social information more positively (making more 
positive intent attributions, generating more positive responses and evaluating reciprocity 
more positively), as reflected by their total positive-vignettes score are more likely to 
cooperate in the RPD. Finally, we investigated whether positive and negative intent 
attribution, response generation or response evaluation would predict different levels of 
cooperation in the RPD. 
 
Results 
SIP responses to positive and negative vignettes 
In our study children received the SIP measure first. They read three negative 
vignettes and three positive vignettes (for the full measure see Appendix D). Since we 
used the more traditional negative vignettes as an anchor to compare answers to positive 
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vignettes, children read the negative ones first. After each vignette, children answered a 
series of questions that focused on three of the SIP steps: intent attribution (step 2), 
response formulation (step 4) and response evaluation (step 5). Children responded to 
each question on a 4 point Likert scale. Scores were computed by averaging the relevant 
questions for each of the SIP steps tested.  
On average, children attributed higher positive intent for ambiguous positive 
outcome interactions than negative intent for ambiguous negative outcome interactions 
(positive intent, positive outcome: M = 2.178, SD = 0.558; negative intent, negative 
outcome: M = 1.223, SD = 0.735, t = 13.648, p < 0.001). They also rated the likelihood of 
generating positive behavioral responses to a positive interaction as higher than the 
likelihood of generating negative behavioral responses (i.e., verbal or physical 
aggression) following a negative interaction (positive behavioral response: M = 2.179, SD 
= 0.563, negative behavioral responses: M = 0.798, SD = 0.598, t = 20.297, p < 0.001). 
Also, unsurprisingly, kids evaluated positive behaviors in response to positive 
interactions more positively than negative behaviors in response to negative interactions 
(evaluation of positive behavior: M = 2.496, SD = 0.473; evaluation of negative behavior: 
M = 0.915, SD = 0.492, t = 27.151, p < 0.001). This was true both on average and for 
each of the evaluation dimensions individually: self-efficacy, positivity of consequences 
and moral value of the behavior (see Table 13). 
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Table 13. Comparison of mean SIP responses for negative and positive outcome 
vignettes 
    Negative   Positive   Paired t-tests 
                      
    M SD   M SD   t df p 
Intent attribution 1.222 0.735   2.178 0.558   13.64 163 <0.001 
Behavioral response 0.798 0.598 
 
2.179 0.563 
 
20.29 163 <0.001 
Evaluation 0.915 0.492 
 
2.496 0.473 
 
27.15 161 <0.001 
 
Self-efficacy/Ease 1.263 0.705 
 
2.367 0.545 
 
14.69 163 <0.001 
 
Consequences 0.865 0.556 
 
1.528 0.483 
 
27.85 164 <0.001 
  Moral acceptability/Value 0.624 0.542   2.601 0.508   31.01 163 <0.001 
 
Negative SIP vignettes 
To check whether the current SIP measure replicated findings from previous 
studies (e.g., see a meta-analysis by de Castro et al., 2002 and a cross-cultural study by 
Dodge et al., 2015), we used linear regression models to investigate the connection 
between hostile attribution bias (step 2) and the likelihood of formulating an aggressive 
response (step 4; see Table 14). In agreement with findings from previous studies, hostile 
attribution bias significantly predicted an increase in generating aggressive responses (Β 
= 0.298, p < 0.001). We also checked whether positive evaluation of aggressive 
responses (step 5) was related to increased likelihood of generating such responses (step 
4; Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Godwin, 2013; Dodge Laird, Lochman & Zelli, 2002; 
Dodge et al., 1997), and found that higher perceived self-efficacy in being aggressive, 
and higher perceived moral acceptability of aggression, but not positive evaluation of 
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aggression consequences significantly predicted higher likelihood of aggressive 
responses (self efficacy: Β = 0.251, p < 0.001; moral acceptability: Β = 0.415, p < 0.001). 
 
Table 14. Predictors of selecting a aggressive response (step 4) in the negative SIP 
vignettes 
  Β   SE 95% CI 
          
Intercept 0.376 
 
0.419 
  Age -0.050 
 
0.040 -0.13 0.03 
Gender 0.013 
 
0.064 -0.11 0.14 
Negative intent 0.299 
 
0.046*** 0.21 0.39 
Self-efficacy 0.251 
 
0.053*** 0.15 0.35 
Consequences -0.036 
 
0.080 -0.20 0.12 
Moral acceptability 0.415 
 
0.088*** 0.24 0.59 
      # Children 163 
    R2 0.56 
    F(6,156) 33.44         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	 	 	 
Positive SIP vignettes 
To further investigate whether processing of social information functions in 
analogous ways when interactions and their outcomes are positive, we used linear 
regression models to mirror the analyses we conducted for responses to the negative 
vignettes (see Table 15). We found that increased attribution of positive intent 
significantly predicted increased likelihood of generating a positive response (Β = 0.351, 
p < 0.001). Also a higher perceived ease of responding positively was significantly 
related to higher likelihood of generating a positive response (Β = 0.433, p < 0.001). 
Neither positive evaluation of the consequences nor their perceived moral acceptability 
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(which were unsurprisingly very high) influenced significantly the likelihood of 
generating a positive response. 
 
Table 15. Predictors of selecting a positive response (step 4) in the SIP positive vignettes 
  Β   SE 95% CI 
          
Intercept 1.281 
 
0.461 
  Age -0.090 
 
0.044 -0.18 0.00 
Gender 0.057 
 
0.072 -0.08 0.20 
Positive intent 0.351 
 
0.068*** 0.22 0.48 
Self-efficacy 0.433 
 
0.110*** 0.21 0.65 
Consequences -0.159 
 
0.142 -0.44 0.12 
Moral acceptability 0.150 
 
0.130 -0.11 0.41 
      # Children 163 
    R2 0.37 
    F(6, 156) 15.26         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	 	 
 
Age and social information processing 
We then investigated the relation between children’s age and gender and SIP both 
in negative and positive social interactions. Age significantly predicted attribution of 
negative intent in negative interactions, with older children making fewer negative intent 
attributions (Β = -0.166, p = 0.015). Attribution of positive intent in positive interactions 
was not significantly predicted by age (Β = 0.098, p = 0.063). Neither the generation of 
negative behavioral responses (i.e., verbal or physical aggression), nor positive 
behavioral responses differed with age (negative behavioral response: Β = -0.062, p = 
0.271; positive behavioral response: Β = -0.026, p = 0.630). Older children evaluated 
		 98	
both the consequences and the moral acceptability of aggressive responses in negative 
interactions more positively (consequences: Β = 0.122, p = 0.019; moral acceptability: Β 
= 0.121, p = 0.018). There were no age differences in the evaluation of positive responses 
to positive interactions (self-efficacy/ease: Β = 0.063, p = 0.221; consequences: Β = 
0.036, p = 0.423; moral value: Β = 0.083, p = 0.080). Gender was not significantly related 
to any of the SIP steps for neither negative nor positive social interactions. 
In sum, the positive and negative SIP vignettes produced results that were 
consistent with prior results. Notably, children children appeared to use similar 
processing steps in the positive and negative vignettes, with intent attribution and self-
efficacy predicting response selection in both cases. 
 
Social information processing and reactive and proactive aggression 
Previous studies have found a relationship between hostile attribution bias 
(negative intent) and reactive aggression, and positive evaluation of aggressive responses 
and proactive aggression. To replicate these studies we used regression models to check 
the relation between different SIP steps in negative interactions and the PRPA measure 
(continuous scores). We found that the likelihood of generating aggressive responses as 
measured by the SIP measure significantly predicted the overall aggression (reactive and 
proactive combined) measured through the PRPA (Β = 1.041, p = 0.020). However, we 
failed to replicate the differential associations between specific SIP steps and reactive and 
proactive aggression. Reactive aggression was not significantly predicted by negative 
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intent attribution (Β = -0.129, p = 0.640), and proactive aggression was not significantly 
predicted by positive evaluation of aggression (Β = 0.634, p = 0.207). 
 
Positive and Negative SIP responses and the RPD 
Finally, we investigated the relation between SIP measured through the negative 
and positive vignettes and cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  We 
first computed an overall SIP score (range: 0 to 3) for the negative vignettes indicating 
the degree to which each child processed social information negatively by making 
negative intent attributions, generating aggressive responses and evaluating aggression 
positively. We used a regression model with children’s decisions in the RPD as a 
dependent variable and the overall SIP score for the negative vignettes as an independent 
variable. Age and gender were introduced as covariates. We found no relationship 
between the negativity of SIP for negative vignettes and the likelihood of cooperating (or 
defecting) in the RPD game (Β = -0.016, p = 0.179). We also computed an analogous 
overall SIP score for the positive vignettes (range: 0 to 3), indicating the degree to which 
each child processed social information positively by making positive intent attributions, 
generating positive behavioral responses and evaluating these responses positively. We 
used a similar regression model with children’s decisions in the RPD as the dependent 
variable and the overall SIP score for positive vignettes as the independent variable, 
controlling for age and gender. Again, we found no relation between this overall 
positivity score and cooperation in the RPD game (Β = 0.327, p = 0.208). Lastly, we 
checked whether the cooperation in the PD game was predicted by any of the measured 
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SIP steps for the negative vignettes and then separately for the positive vignettes. We 
again found no significant relationships between any of the variables (see Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Social information processing steps and cooperation in the RPD 
 
Negative vignettes Positive vignettes 
            
       Β   SE 95% CI Β   SE 95% CI 
Intercept -4.088 
 
1.018*** 
 
-4.879 
 
1.064*** 
  Age 0.339 
 
0.101** 0.14 0.54 0.345 
 
0.100** 0.15 0.54 
Gender 0.099 
 
0.166 -0.23 0.43 0.097 
 
0.168 -0.23 0.42 
Intent attribution 0.032 
 
0.135 -0.23 0.30 0.077 
 
0.166 -0.25 0.40 
Behavioral response -0.148 
 
0.202 -0.55 0.25 0.069 
 
0.190 -0.30 0.44 
Evaluation 0.150 
 
0.222 -0.28 0.58 0.181 
 
0.218 -0.25 0.61 
           
           Log Likelihood -3019.142 
    
-3124.211 
    # Observations 4890 
    
4890 
    # Children/Clusters 163 
    
163 
    χ2(df) 14.03(5) 
    
16.37 
    Pseudo R2 0.01         0.02         
         	 	 
Discussion 
The findings of this study partially supported the idea that the SIP model can also 
explain behavior generation in positive social interactions. Results confirmed our first 
hypothesis, that the new positive outcome vignettes and updated negative outcome 
vignettes both generated responses consistent with SIP theory. However, other prior 
results failed to replicate. Namely, we found no relationship between reactive and 
proactive aggression and a hostile attribution bias or the overall SIP scores. Additionally, 
we found no indication that the SIP results generalized to situations outside the vignette 
		 101	
scenarios. Responses to both the positive and negative vignettes did not predict different 
levels of cooperation in the RPD. However, our analyses did reveal intriguing effects of 
age on SIP cognitions. 
Our findings verified that the SIP questionnaire developed for this study was a 
valid measure of the SIP framework. We replicated previous results for negative 
vignettes in the literature, finding that attribution of negative/hostile intent significantly 
predicted aggressive responses, as well as more positive evaluation of aggression (Crick 
& Dodge, 1996). The positive vignettes were novel and also showed response patterns 
consistent with SIP theory. Combined these results provide a validation that the vignettes 
used here tested the same cognitive constructs as previously used questionnaires. 
This study’s main contribution to the SIP literature is testing the model’s 
mechanisms for positive outcome interactions. This was accomplished by using an 
extended SIP questionnaire that includes positive-outcome vignettes. We showed that 
positive intent attribution is related to an increase in generating positive responses. Also, 
we showed that the perceived ease in carrying out positive responses was associated with 
a higher likelihood of generating such responses.  
The relationship between positive intentions and reciprocity has been studied in 
developmental psychology (e.g., Vogelsang & Tomasello, 2016; Vaish, Hepach, & 
Tomasello, 2017; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). Children distinguish between different 
types of intentions and base their decisions to reciprocate not on outcome alone but on 
the underlying intention as well (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010). Although the SIP results 
focus on hypothetical scenarios, they show that even in ambiguous situations in which 
		 102	
intentions are not clear or directly observable, positive reciprocity still depends on how 
the situation is represented in the mind: as having positive or neutral intent. This is 
notable given that previous studies have found that attribution of intent is reduced when 
the outcome is positive (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). These results are consistent with 
the SIP model.  
Unsurprisingly, children had high positive evaluations (almost at ceiling) of 
positive responses both in terms of consequences and moral value. This had no effect on 
their positive response selection within the SIP model. Perceived ease in carrying out the 
positive response was also related to positive responding. However, it is unclear how 
children interpreted this question: “would it be easy or hard for you to say or do 
something nice to the other child?”. Did they think of their ability to be nice or how 
costly it would be for them to be nice to the other child? We tried to keep our questions 
consistent across positive and negative scenarios, but our results suggest that for the 
generation of positive behaviors in positive interactions, other evaluation criteria might 
be relevant than for negative behaviors. Even though response evaluation might be an 
essential component of all response formulation, the relevant evaluation criteria might be 
more situation-specific. Future SIP measures should be developed to investigate which 
evaluation criteria are relevant for positive response selection. 
The results from the negative outcome SIP vignettes allowed us to test the  
relationships between hostile attribution and reactive aggression, and between positive 
evaluations of aggression and proactive aggression that have been found in other studies 
(Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Crick & Dodge, 1996; Kempes et al., 2006). We found that 
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children’s aggressive response selection in the vignettes significantly predicted parent 
report of overall aggression (PRPA; Kempes et al., 2006). However, we found none of 
the predicted relationships for reactive and proactive aggression specifically. Intriguingly, 
other studies have also failed to replicate these results. For example, Dodge et al. (1997) 
found no differences in hostile attribution between reactive and proactive aggression. 
Kempes et al. (2006) also did not find correlations between positive evaluations of 
aggression consequences and proactive aggression. We consider three possible 
explanations for these replication failures. 
First, methodological reasons could be responsible for this null result. Studies of 
SIP and reactive and proactive aggression have relied on a variety of measures (for a 
review of reactive and proactive aggression measures, see Polman et al., 2007). Reactive 
and proactive aggression measures have taken different forms, from questionnaires to 
observation-based measures. They have also relied on different informants (teachers, 
parents, self), with cross-informant agreement usually being very low. Also, they have 
sometimes distinguished not just between the function of aggression (reactive or 
proactive) but also the form (physical or relational). According to Polman et al., the 
distinction between physical and relational aggression may be a more relevant distinction 
than reactive and proactive aggression.  
Second, SIP measures have also varied a lot in terms of their form (text-based, 
video-based, real interaction), the number of SIP steps they test, whether the same 
vignette is used to test multiple steps or just one, the hypothetical scenarios presented 
(provocation situations or peer rejection situations), the types of questions asked (open 
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ended or multiple choice), and the way the questions are formulated. A review and meta-
analysis by de Castro et al. (2002) highlights further differences in SIP measures of intent 
attribution. Given the wide variety of measures used, the absence of conclusive results 
could be due to methodological diversity, although it is difficult to pinpoint the relevant 
feature responsible. For example, it is possible that children require richer interactions 
involving perhaps facial cues, or deeper knowledge of the other child in order to make 
relevant intent attributions. A systematic review would be needed to clarify which 
methodological features play an important role in the way SIP measurements and 
reactive-proactive aggression measurements are connected.  
Lastly, it is also possible that differences in the population tested might account 
for our failure to replicate the findings. Our participants represent a non-clinical sample 
with relatively low levels of reactive and proactive aggression. Although this is a 
plausible explanation, we believe it is unlikely given that prior work showing the 
relationship between reactive and proactive aggression and SIP processing also used a 
community sample (Crick & Dodge, 1996). It is also important to note that children from 
different SES backgrounds or children of different ethnicities might produce different 
kinds of interpretations of the same social interaction, thus further research is needed to 
understand how other factors might mediate the link between SIP and aggression.  
We had hypothesized that a predisposition to attribute positive intent in 
ambiguous positive interactions in the SIP may predict cooperation in the RPD. However, 
none of the SIP steps for either negative or positive scenarios were related to decision 
patterns in the RPD. Given that children’s perceptions of their partner’s motivations 
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influenced their cooperation in the RPD (see Chapter 3), it seemed plausible that 
children’s positive intent attributions in SIP measures would also be related to 
cooperation in the RPD. However, this relationship did not emerge across the tasks and 
differences between the SIP vignettes and the RPD may help to explain the null result. In 
the RPD game, the outcome always depends on the combined actions of the two partners, 
whereas in the SIP vignettes the interaction partner is the only one responsible for the 
action. In the RPD game, cooperation can be self-interested, whereas in the SIP vignettes 
there is no direct incentive for responding positively. In the RPD game, the interaction is 
repeated while the SIP vignettes describe a single stimulus and a single response. Thus it 
is possible that cooperation in the RPD depends on a more intricate set of cognitions than 
simple intent attribution, which motivates positive responses in the SIP scenarios.  
Our analyses did yield some intriguing results regarding age differences in SIP 
responding. We found that hostile intent attribution decreased with age, but found no age 
differences in positive intent attributions. This is in agreement with the proposal that 
inferring benign intent is more developmentally advanced and cognitively taxing than 
inferring hostility (Dodge, 2006). Better cognitive capacities, learning and socialization 
are all needed to override the more primitive representation that negative personal 
outcomes always happen through another’s hostile intentional action. Cognitive 
development related to the contemplation of alternatives and thinking about hypothetical 
possibilities could be responsible for different patterns of attributional biases (Dodge, 
2006), and might explain the decrease in hostile attribution bias between 9 and 11 years 
of age.  
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The evaluation of consequences and moral acceptability of aggression were also 
related to age, with older children giving more positive evaluations of aggression. This is 
in accordance with the results of Huesmann and Guerra (1997) who, in a large scale 
longitudinal study found that elementary school children tended to approve more of 
aggression with age, which was also related to an increase in their aggressive behavior. 
Note however, that these findings were obtained from measures other than vignette-based 
SIP questionnaires and children in this study came from low SES, high-crime 
neighborhoods, so it is unclear whether the same factors contribute to an increase with 
age in positive evaluation of aggression in our sample. Unlike this study we found no 
changes in parent-reported aggression with age.  
In summary, we found partial evidence for the SIP model’s consistency in 
explaining how children think about both positive and negative social interactions. We 
showed that positive outcome vignettes are generally eliciting responses consistent with 
the SIP framework, even though more work is needed to further specify the last step of 
the SIP model: how positive responses are evaluated. However, this study found no 
connections between the SIP measure and proactive and reactive aggression or 
cooperative behavior in the RPD. This suggests that further research is needed for 
establishing whether the SIP model is generalizable to situations outside the hypothetical 
scenarios task. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: TRAITS, COGNITIONS, 
AND BEHAVIORS IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
This dissertation has shown how traits, cognitions and behaviors that are relevant 
for social interactions can be studied in an integrative way by combining approaches and 
measures from developmental psychology, behavioral economics and game theory. We 
used aggression and its varying manifestations in social interactions as a point of focus. 
With the goal of studying live negative social interactions in a safe and rigorously 
quantifiable way, we first explored how the RPD, a measure from behavioral economics 
and game theory, could be used as a minimal social interaction. We showed that 
decisions in the game are motivated by rich social cognitions and that patterns of play 
reveal strategic behavior that can be analyzed in terms of game theoretic principles. We 
then showed that patterns of decisions in the RPD can also capture behavioral signatures 
of different aggression types, reactive and proactive. More specifically, we found that 
reactive aggression is characterized by lack of return to cooperation following partner 
defection, indicating persistent and unforgiving reactivity to negative social experiences. 
Finally, we researched the SIP theoretical model, which has successfully described how 
various cognitions lead to the formulation of aggressive behaviors in social interactions, 
and showed how it might be relevant for explaining the formulation of positive social 
behaviors as well. Together these findings constitute a promising start for the unification 
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of cognitive and behavioral measures from two different research traditions and the 
unification of theoretical models of positive and negative social interactions. 
For this study we developed a novel, computerized version of the RPD based on a 
visual interface that has been used successfully with children (Blake et al., 2015). In the 
standard PD, two players must simultaneously decide to either Cooperate (C) or Defect 
(D). The combined decision determines how many points each player gets. In the current 
version, mutual cooperation (CC) pays 3 points each and mutual defection (DD) pays 1 
point each. However, if one player cooperates and the other defects (CD or DC), the 
cooperator receives zero and the defector receives 4 points. Over multiple rounds, mutual 
cooperation can lead to high payoffs, but there is always a short-term incentive to defect.  
Chapter 3 described how children construe this RPD task. Game theory has made 
various predictions regarding the behavior of rational agents in the RPD, based on game 
characteristics: the number of rounds, the payoff structure etc. Studies with adults have 
observed behaviors in the RPD and cognitions have been inferred from experimental 
manipulations of the game set-up. However, only a relatively small number of studies 
have directly probed cognitions and motivations in the RPD. No such studies had been 
previously done with children.  
In order to use the RPD to study maladaptive social behaviors such as aggression, 
we first needed to know if children thought of the RPD as a real social interaction. This 
dissertation shows that when asked to motivate their decisions in the game, children made 
reference to very rich social cognitions focused on trust, reciprocity, joint gain, personal 
interest, taking advantage of the partner, prosocial reasons, and personality traits 
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(belonging to themselves or the partners). This verifies that children interpret the RPD as 
a real social interaction. Their motivations were also related to their behavior in the game. 
Children who made reference to interpersonal motivations, explaining their decisions in 
the game in relation to those of the partner, were more likely to cooperate. Also 
perceiving the partner’s motivations as being more interpersonal lead to increased 
cooperation. 
Probing children’s interpretations of their decisions in the RPD is crucial for 
informing our own interpretation of their behavior. For example, defection in the game 
could mean either “I’m playing it safe” or “I’m exploiting my partner”. Repeated 
defection could mean “I don’t trust you” or “I’m angry with you”. More work is needed 
to gain a deep understanding of how children view specific situations in the game. In this 
study we were only able to ask children why they decided to cooperate or defect in 
general. (We asked in a neutral language about pushing and pulling, the two actions in 
the game that amounted to cooperation and defection respectively). However, 
cooperation and defection in a repeated game are modulated by the specific history of 
that interaction, and in principle they could mean different things at different points in the 
game. It is possible that the child defects at first to play it safe but after they have been 
reassured that the partner is cooperative they realize they can take advantage of the 
partner’s kindness. Future research is needed to get that level of resolution for our 
understanding of how the RPD interaction is interpreted by children. 
We have also shown that children approach the RPD in a strategic fashion. In 
Chapters 3 and 4, we show how children’s sequences of play approximate, above chance 
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levels, standard strategies from game theory. Blake et al. (2015) have previously shown 
that children play contingently: their cooperation in the game is dependent on the 
partner’s actions. We replicated those findings through analyses described in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, we were able to show that patterns of play in the game can be related to types 
of aggressive behavior in real life. This is important not just for validating the RPD as a 
measure of social interactions, but also for creating novel ways to rigorously quantify 
social behavior in the context of child psychopathology.  
Maladaptive social interactions both characterize and represent a risk for 
psychopathology in children, and one of the most common ways in which social 
interactions go wrong in childhood involves aggressive behavior. In chapter 4 we showed 
how children rated high on reactive aggression by their parents defected in response to 
partner defection, and failed to return to cooperation even after repeated attempts from a 
generally cooperative partner to restore mutual cooperation. High reactive aggressive 
children preferred the unforgiving game theoretic strategy GRIM, in which the player 
never returns to cooperation following partner defection. These findings suggest that 
reactive aggressive children not only engage in negative interpretation of–and negative  
response to–certain social behaviors, but that they also have difficulty in moving past 
negative interactions and resolving conflict. This could be because of a propensity 
towards persistent anger, or because of difficulty with restoring trust in a partner that has 
displayed negative action. Both of these options find support in the previous literature 
(Sharp et al., 2011; Waschbusch et al., 2002). However, our results add to this literature 
by showing that even after a GRIM response to the partner’s defection, high reactive 
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children are able to start fresh with a new partner. Therefore, if anger is the underlying 
cause of an aggressive reaction, it is highly targeted toward individual actors. Further 
research is needed to elucidate this matter, and experimental manipulations with the RPD 
task would be a fruitful means fur further inquiry. 
The ability to capture signatures of aggression in RPD play patterns is also 
significant for longer-term research goals involving more generally the study of social 
interactions in the context of child psychopathology. Traditional measures of maladaptive 
social behavior are primarily report measures documenting either past experiences or 
reactions to hypothetical scenarios and do not measure real behavior as it happens. They 
rely heavily on language abilities and are difficult to standardize across ages. The RPD 
on the other hand measures behavior as it happens in real, incentivized interactions, can 
be used across a wide age range and is a practical tool for functional brain imaging and 
ERP studies (e.g., Rilling et al., 2007). The RPD also offers advantages over the other 
few live interaction tasks that have been used for studying aggression: it is not a purely 
competitive task, it allows for both positive and negative interactions to occur, and it 
provides an ongoing signal of the partner’s simultaneous decisions. The RPD is a 
versatile measure that can be used to study a variety of behaviors and cognitions, both 
positive and negative. Thus the RPD could also be used to standardize the measurement 
of negative and positive social behaviors in development. 
More broadly, this dissertation describes an attempt to breach the divide between 
the study of positive and negative social interactions. We have only been partially 
successful in accomplishing this goal, as we have shown that responses to SIP measures 
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with positive-outcome vignettes are consistent with SIP theory, but failed to find 
statistically significant connections between these responses and real, cooperative 
behavior in the RPD. 
The SIP model has been used to explain the thought processes involved in 
formulating aggressive behaviors, but the framework was intended as a more general 
explanation for how all social behavior is produced. The framework proposes several 
information processing steps: encoding of situational cues, attribution of intent, goal 
selection, response generation, response evaluation and finally response selection and 
production. The model has been generally tested through hypothetical vignettes 
describing a social interaction, followed by questions meant to capture cognitions that 
appear during every step of the response formulation process: how many social cues are 
encoded? Is the action in the vignette perceived as hostile or benign? What goal is 
adopted for the situation, relational or instrumental? Finally, what are the possible 
behavioral responses that come to mind, and how positively are they evaluated? 
Attribution of hostile intent and positive evaluation of aggression in these hypothetical 
scenarios have been linked to real life aggressive behavior. 
In this study we wanted to also test whether the same steps are involved in the 
formulation of positive behaviors in positive social interactions, and how they might 
relate to prosocial behaviors in the RPD. To accomplish this, we created an extended SIP 
measure that included not only the traditional negative-outcome vignettes but also novel, 
positive outcome-vignettes in which the action of the partner was ambiguous. This 
allowed us to measure whether the positive action was perceived as purposeful or 
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accidental, whether the action was reciprocated or not and how positively was reciprocity 
evaluated.  
In the formulation of positive responses to these hypothetical scenarios, we found 
mechanisms consistent with SIP theory: attribution of positive intent significantly 
predicted social reciprocity. Positive evaluation in terms of consequences and moral 
value of the response were at ceiling, but the perceived ease in carrying out the positive 
response significantly predicted positive reciprocity. However, these responses for the 
SIP vignettes failed to predict cooperative behavioral patterns in the RPD. We also failed 
to replicate previous findings that linked reactive and proactive aggression to hostile 
attribution and positive evaluation of aggression in the negative scenarios. Further work 
is needed to establish why no connections were found. However, it remains plausible and 
likely that children’s thoughts are linked to their behavior only within the specific tasks 
used. Therefore, testing children perceptions of their partner’s intentions in the RPD may 
be a better predictor of their decisions in that task. 
In summary, the study of social interactions, which has been the topic of this 
dissertation, is critical for ensuring children’s well-being and life success. It is therefore 
important to quantify maladaptive social cognitions and behaviors in a rigorous 
parametric manner. We have shown that strategic games, such as the RPD are exemplary 
tools for doing this. The continued study of social interactions in strategic games can thus 
provide a foundation for the development of targeted interventions and therapies for 
pathological social behaviors. Further, while negative interactions have received more 
attention due to their health impact, it is also important to study positive social 
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interactions, their cognitive underpinnings, and how positive social behaviors can be 
encouraged and maintained. Finally, to obtain a unified view of both negative and 
positive interactions, the merging of approaches from different research traditions is not 
only fruitful, as we have shown in this dissertation, but may also be necessary. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions and comprehension checks for the RPD measure 
An image of the game board (see Fig. 2) appears on each screen that becomes partially 
interactive when the explanation requires it. Children receive the following instructions 
that self-guide them through a demonstration of the task and check their comprehension. 
Children must pass the comprehension checks before proceeding to the testing phase. 
 
 This is what you will see on your screen. The hand below is you. The hand at the top is 
your partner. Click on the button below to move to the next screen. 
 
You can make your hand push the trays or pull them.  
Click the “Push” button below to see what happens. 
The coins that end up on the green area at the bottom go to you. The coins that end up on 
the green area at the top go to your partner. The coins that get stuck on the red area 
belong to no one and they disappear. 
When you click the Push button, your partner gets 3 coins and 1 coin gets stuck on the 
red area and no one gets it. Click on the button below to move to the next screen. 
 
Now click the “Pull” button to see what happens.  
When you click Pull, you get 1 coin and 3 coins get stuck on the red area and no one 
gets those. Click on the button below when you are ready to move to the next screen. 
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Your partner can also make their hand push the trays or pull them. Click on the “View” 
button below to see what happens. If your partner clicks Pull, then they get 1 coin. If they 
click Push, then you get 3 coins. Click on the button below when you are ready for some 
practice rounds. 
 
These are practice rounds and they are not part of the real game. This is just to show you 
what can happen in the game. In the real game you will be playing 10 rounds with each 
partner. 
 
Please start by clicking on the "Push" button. 
Great! You clicked on the “Push” button and your partner clicked on the “Push” button. 
You got 3 points and your partner got 3 points. 
 
Click on the “Push” button again. 
Great! You clicked on the “Push” button and your partner clicked on the “Pull” button. 
You got 0 points and your partner got 4 points. 
 
Now click on the “Pull” button. 
Great! You clicked on the “Pull” button and your partner clicked on the “Push” button. 
You got 4 points and your partner got 0 points. 
 
Click on the “Pull” button again. 
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Great! You clicked on the “Pull” button and your partner clicked on the “Pull” button. 
You got 1 point and your partner got 1 point. 
 
Comprehension check: 
The child needs to pass the comprehension checks before being able to play the game. 
The platform will not allow the child to proceed unless they get the questions right. 
Children are prompted to type their answer into text boxes for their points and the 
partner’s points. 
If they child inputs the wrong answer the following message appears: 
Incorrect! Please try again... 
If the child inputs the correct answer the following message appears: 
Correct! 
 
If you click “Push” and your partner clicks “Push” how many do you get? And how many 
does your partner get? 
 
If you click “Push” and your partner clicks “Pull” how many do you get? And how many 
does your partner get? 
 
If you click “Pull” and your partner clicks “Push” how many do you get? And how many 
does your partner get? 
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If you click “Pull” and your partner clicks “Pull” how many do you get? And how many 
does your partner get? 
 
What combination of buttons delivers the most points for you and your partner 
combined? 
* You: Push Partner: Push 
* You: Push Partner: Pull 
* You: Pull Partner: Push 
* You: Pull Partner: Pull 
 
How many rounds are you going to play with each partner? 
* 2 
* 3 
* 8 
* 10 Once	you	are	ready	to	begin	the	game	press	the	button	below	and	we	will	connect	you	to	another	child	over	the	internet.	
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APPENDIX B 
 
Summary of coding scheme for motivations in the RPD 
 
After the RPD task, children were asked to type open-ended responses to the 
following questions: 
1. We are interested in how you played the game.  Please describe why you 
clicked the push and the pull buttons. 
2. Sometimes your partner pressed “pull”. Why do you think they did that? 
3. Sometimes your partner pressed “push”. Why do you think they did that? 
A coding scheme was developed by the author and thesis supervisor based on 
motivations and reasons for decisions that have been examined for adults who have done 
similar cooperative dilemma tasks (Dreber et al., 2014). These a priori coding categories 
were then checked against the responses to determine whether categories needed to be 
added, modified or removed. As a result of this process two categories were combined: 
competitive defection, safety-motivated defection since the wording of children’s 
answers did not allow for us to make a clear distinction between the two. The final 
categories were intended to capture all unique motivations that would affect decisions in 
the RPD and thus children could mention multiple motivations for each question. 
Children’s answers to the questions were coded by two independent coders who 
were blind to any other information about the child including, their age, gender and 
decisions in the game. Answers were assigned a code of 1 for each type or subtype of 
motivation the child mentioned and a code of 0 if the type was not mentioned. Children 
who mentioned more that one motivation received a code of 1 for each type or subtype 
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they mentioned. Average Cohen’s kappa for inter-coder reliability was 0.72. 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion between the two coders.  
 
Interpersonal 
motivations 
At least one of the 4 subcategories below was mentioned 
Trust Decisions are motivated by trust in the partner or are an attempt to test 
whether the partner is trustworthy and will cooperate 
Reciprocity Decisions are an attempt for players to mirror each other, either by 
mirroring the partner’s response or trying to elicit a reciprocal response 
from the partner 
 
Fairness Decisions are a way to ensure fairness, equality or to share points 
Joint gain Decisions are motivated by mutual benefits from cooperation 
  
Strategic self 
interest 
At least one of the 2 subcategories below was mentioned 
Personal gain Decisions are made to get points, to win or to prevent the partner from 
winning 
Advantage 
taking 
Decisions are meant to trick the partner and take advantage of their 
generosity or gullibility 
  
Prosocial Decisions are motivated by positive personality or character traits: 
being nice, kind, helpful, generous etc. 
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APPENDIX C 
The Parent-rating scale of Reactive and Proactive Aggression (PRPA) 
 
The measure was developed by Kempes, Matthys, Maassen, van Goozen, & van 
Engeland (2006). The procedures for creating and validating the measure can be found in 
this paper and the measure can be retrieved from the paper’s appendix. The questionnaire 
consists of 11 items, 6 items measuring reactive aggression and 5 items measuring 
proactive aggression. Parents are asked to indicate the frequency of different types of 
behaviors on a 3-point Likert scale, choosing between: never (0), sometimes (1) and often 
(2).  
 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics for the PRPA 
 
  Mean SD Median N of kids with  Actual Min-Max 
        median score Range   
Reactive aggression 2.95 2.93 3 19 0-10 0-12 
       Proactive aggression 0.92 1.26 1 47 0-6 0-10 
       We compared scores from the sample described in this dissertation with those 
reported by Kempes, de Vries, Matthys, van Engeland, & van Hooff (2008). Our findings 
are consistent with those found by Kempes et al. for the non-clinical population (normal 
controls) in their study (see Table C2). 
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Table C2. Comparisons between current data and Kempes et al. (2008). Scores were 
transformed to fall within a range of 0 to 1. T-tests show differences between the current 
data (used in this dissertation) and results by Kempes et al. 
 
 
Current data Kempes et al. 2008 
      Normal controls Disruptive behavior disorder 
  N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) t N Mean (SD) t 
         Reactive aggression 153 0.25 (0.20) 39 0.31 (0.23) 1.62 39 0.68 (0.24) 11.49*** 
         Proactive 
aggression 158 0.09 (0.13) 39 0.07 (0.09) 0.91 39 0.33 (0.21) 9.00*** 
                  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
       scores transformed to fall into a 0-1 range 
       
 
Figure C1. Distribution of scores for the PRPA measure 		
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APPENDIX	D 
SIP QUESTIONNAIRE 
Negative-outcome vignettes: 
1) Imagine that you are on your way to school one morning. As you are walking a 
homework paper falls out of a notebook that you are carrying. A kid you know walks by 
and steps on the paper, leaving a muddy footprint right across the middle. The kid looks 
at your homework paper then looks at you. 
2) Imagine it’s a hot day and you just got an ice cream cone. You are holding your 
ice cream in your hand and are about to eat it. A kid you know bumps into you and your 
ice cream falls on the pavement. The kid looks at the melting ice cream then looks at you. 
3) Imagine you are in class one day. The teacher asks you to go write something 
on the board. A kid you know has his foot in the aisle and you trip over it. The kid looks 
at his foot then looks at you. 
 
Positive-outcome vignettes: 
1) Imagine you are on the playground one afternoon. You are walking past a 
group of kids who are having a lot of fun playing with a soccer ball. A kid you know 
kicks the ball in your direction and the ball lands near you. The kid looks at the ball then 
looks at you. 
2) Imagine that you are in art class one day. You are painting a landscape and you 
need blue paint for the sky, but you can’t find the container. A kid you know walks by 
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carrying a jar of blue paint and puts it down next to you. The kid looks at the blue paint 
then looks at you. 
3) Imagine that you are in the cafeteria one day. You are holding your lunch tray 
and looking for a seat but the cafeteria is full and all seats are taken. A kid you know 
stands up and clears the table in front of him. The kid looks at the empty seat then looks 
at you. 
Questions: 
Intent attribution: 
 not at all a little much very 
much 
1. How much do you think the kid did this on 
purpose? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. How much do you think the kid was trying 
to be mean/nice? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
Response generation: 
 
    
 definitely 
would not 
probably 
would not 
probably 
would 
definitely 
would 
3. Would you do or say something mean/nice 
to the kid in the future? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. Would you do or say something mean/nice 
to the kid right away? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
Response evaluation: 
 
a) Self-efficacy/Ease: 
 
    
 very easy pretty easy pretty 
hard 
very hard 
5. Would it be easy or hard for you to do or 
say something mean/nice to the kid in the 
future? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Would it be easy or hard for you to do or 
say something mean/nice to the kid right 
away? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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b) Consequences:     
 very well pretty well pretty bad very bad 
7. Would things turn out well or badly if you 
did or said something mean/nice to the kid in 
the future? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. Would things turn out well or badly if you 
did or said something mean/nice to the kid 
right away? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
c) Moral acceptability/value: 
 
    
 very good pretty 
good 
pretty bad very bad 
9. Do you think it is good or bad to do or say 
something mean/nice to the kid in the future? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. Do you think it is good or bad to do or say 
something mean/nice to the kid right away? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Table D1.  Internal consistency of the measure across the different vignettes for each of 
the steps of the SIP model 
  Cronbach's α  
  Negative vignettes Positive vignettes 
Intent attribution 0.85 0.69 
Response generation 0.82 0.76 
Response evaluation 
  Self-efficacy/Ease 0.84 0.80 
Consequences 0.86 0.86 
Moral acceptability/value 0.85 0.85 
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